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The dissertation includes two projects. The first one studies the product market
segmentation and output collusion within substitutes; the second one examines the effects
of WIC program and peers on breastfeeding activities.
In Chapter I, we extend the differentiated product model, first developed by
Bowley (1924), by relaxing the assumption that each firm produces only one
differentiated product. By doing so, we are able to analyze the potential for collusive
market segmentation in a two stage decision framework, first in product space and second
in output. We find that when firms cannot coordinate on output, the required discount
factor that supports collusive market segmentation is strictly decreasing in product
substitutability and is greater than partial output and full collusion. Overall we find that
output collusion alone is easier to sustain than collusive product market segmentation.
In Chapter II, we first use duration analysis techniques to estimate the effects of WIC
participation on breastfeeding activities using a nationwide data. Income ineligible
participants are excluded from the sample. The models with and without peer effects
variables are both estimated. We find that the prenatal WIC participation status does not

have significant effect on breastfeeding activities. Peer effects have significant positive
effects on both partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations but not on breastfeeding
initiation. The magnitude of the peer effects on each individual is different and depends
on the individual’s propensity to breastfeed. The results on peer effects based on the full
sample are consistent with the findings from restricted sample. Knowing more than five
peers who breastfed increases the probability of initiating by 3.7% and the likelihood of
breastfeeding at months 3 and 6 by more than 15%. It also increases the partial and
exclusive breastfeeding durations by 9 and 3 weeks, respectively. The results suggest the
presence of a social multiplier in breastfeeding. Any exogenous change in breastfeeding
behavior due to policy interventions would result in an even greater change due to the
bidirectional influences within peer groups. Peer effects play a more important role for
breastfeeding duration than initiation.
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CHAPTER I
PRODUCT MARKET SEGMENTATION AND OUTPUT COLLUSION WITHIN
SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
1.1

Introduction
Product differentiation and market segmentation have long been recognized as

important strategic choices by firms (Smith et al., 1956). Firms may strategically
differentiate their product(s) by brand and/or quality attributes to uniquely position their
product(s) with consumers. Market segmentation is the strategy of choosing which
products to produce from a finite set of existing or potential product(s).
United States and European courts and antitrust authorities have long recognized
the potential reduction in competition from tacit or overt horizontal agreements to
allocate consumers, products and/or geographic territories (Sullivan and Grimes, 2000;
Belleflamme and Bloch, 2004).Welfare reducing collusion in regards to product space
entails an agreement that ‘you produce product A while I produce product B’ when
independent and competitive decisions would dictate both firms produce both products.
The ability of firms to tacitly collude in restricting output or raising prices in
repeated games is significantly impacted by the differentiability of the firms’ product(s)
(e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984; Chang, 1991;Ross, 1992;Häckner, 1994).To date, the
differentiated products literature has largely focused on collusive output/pricing decisions
rather than also addressing collusive multiproduct (conglomerate) decisions. There is a
1

limited literature that addresses the collusive potential among multiproduct
(conglomerate) firms, each tackling the problem from different directions (i.e. Bernheim
and Winston, 1990; Symeonidis, 2002).1 An even smaller amount of literature has
considered firm decisions as a two stage game, first in product space and second in
price(Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Dobson and Waterson, 1996) or second in quantity
(Fraja, 1992), but this line of literature has not addressed collusion at either stage.
The objective of our research is to analyze the potential for tacit collusion at both
the product choice and quantity decision(s) stages. In the first stage, firms make strategic
decisions over which of the available differentiated product(s) they will produce and in
the second stage make their respective output decisions. To accomplish our objective, we
first extend a commonly used differentiated products model developed by Bowley (1924)
by relaxing the long running assumption that a finite set of differentiated products are
uniquely produced by each firm(i.e. Dixit, 1979: Singh and Vives, 1984; Häckner, 2000;
Symeonidis, 2002). By doing so, the market segmentation decisions of firms can be
endogenized and allow firms to produce perfect overlapping products.
We further consider instances in which the firms are able to only partially or fully
collude across both decision stages. When firms are unable to collude across both
product space and output, we find the dominant strategy between symmetric firms during

1

Bernheim and Winston (1990) analyze the incentive constraints of collusive pricing strategies of firms

experiencing multimarket contact holding product-firm space, product differentiation and geographic
locations constant. Symeonidis (2002) analyzes the impact of exogenous changes in the number of firms,
number of products produced by both firms and product substitutability on the likelihood of collusion via
comparative statics.

2

product selection, regardless of product substitutability, is for both firms to conglomerate
and produce multiple products in contrast to the findings of earlier work by Shaked and
Sutton (1990). Furthermore, the required discount factor that supports collusive market
segmentation is strictly decreasing in product substitutability.
Interestingly, we find under partial collusion that the required minimum discount
factor that supports output collusion alone given ex ante non-cooperative multiproduct
(conglomeration) is strictly less than that required for collusive market segmentation
alone. Additionally, the required minimum discount factor is constant; a result contrary
to both horizontally and vertically differentiated product modeling thus far. We also find
the required minimum discount factor that supports output collusion under noncooperative market segmentation is monotonically increasing; a result that is consistent
with price collusion in Chang’s (1991) and Ross’s (1992) horizontally differentiated
product models, as well as the Cournot setting of Deneckere (1983). However, this result
is in contrast to a Bertrand setting where Deneckere (1983) and Häckner (1994) found a
non-monotonic and monotonically decreasing result, respectively.
Finally, when firms are able to consider full collusion across both decision stages,
we find that the required minimum discount factor that supports both collusive market
segmentation and output is monotonically decreasing as products become closer
substitutes. The minimum required discount factor in this setting is less than that
required for collusive market segmentation alone but greater than that required for output
collusion alone. Therefore, if firms are found to collusively segment the market, output
collusion is a logical progression of the firms’ decision making.

3

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review
of the literature. Section 3 describes the economic model, the solutions of Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, in section 4 we present our conclusions.
1.2

Literature
Though the product differentiation literature is voluminous, we discuss only that

which we believe is most relevant to our analysis. There are several popular linear
models of aggregate demand for horizontally differentiated products. An intensively
used model was developed by Hotelling (1929). It is often assumed that there are two
firms, each firm produces only one product at constant marginal cost, demand is inelastic,
and the differentiated commodity is uniformly distributed.
Using this spatial competition framework with respect to pricing strategies, Chang
(1991) examined the relationship between the degree of product substitutability and the
required discount factor to sustain collusion. Chang (1991)concluded the relationship is
monotonically increasing; as products become closer substitutes, the required discount
factor which sustains price collusion increases.
Based on a vertical differentiation model, Häckner (1994) contradicts the results
of Chang (1991) and found a negative relationship between the degree of product
differentiation and sustainability of price collusion. The argument is that when products
are remote substitutes, the firm producing the high quality product is quite well off even
without collusion and is less likely to collude. Therefore, the discount factor required to
support collusion is relatively small since the low quality firm would agree to collude at a
low discount factor. For the horizontally differentiated products, the author argued the
4

opposite result can be obtained and concluded that theory cannot predict when products
contain both attributes.
Häckner (1995) extends Chang’s (1991) paper by considering the endogenous
choice of Bertrand duopoly competitors in selecting horizontally differentiated products
as a means to facilitate collusion in an infinitely repeated game. The author finds that the
firms’ ability to maintain collusive pricing increases by choosing an optimal degree of
differentiation given varying required discount factors. For sufficiently high discount
factors, firms chose intermediate degree of product substitutability. For sufficiently low
discount factors, firms increase the differentiation of their products to maintain collusion.
The Bowley (1924) model has been a popular linear aggregate demand model,
where the utility function is assumed to be quadratic and strictly concave (i.e. Singh and
Vives, 1984; Häckner, 2000; Symeonidis, 2002; Mukherjee, 2005). Singh and Vives
(1984) analyze the duality of Bertrand and Cournot competition in a differentiated
symmetric duopoly. The authors concluded that if firms can pre commit to either
Cournot or Bertrand competition, the dominant strategy is for firms to choose Cournot
when products are substitute goods and Bertrand for complements. However, Bertrand
competition yielded higher total welfare in equilibrium, regardless of whether the goods
are substitutes or complements.
Häckner (2000) extended Singh and Vives (1984) to include n> 2 heterogeneous
firms. The heterogeneity is in regards to vertical product differentiation on quality and
substitutability/complementarity of products. The author found that the dichotomy
between Bertrand and Cournot competition is sensitive to the duopoly assumption and the

5

results of Singh and Vives (1984) cannot be generalized to the n-firm specification if
quality differences between firms are large and products are complements.
More recently, Mukherjee(2005) compared both Cournot and Bertrand
competition over substitute goods when there is free entry. The author demonstrates that
welfare is higher under Cournot competition for sufficiently differentiated products, but it
is higher yet under Bertrand if the products are close substitutes, a result on par with
Singh and Vives (1984). The reason being is that increases in Cournot competition result
in a larger market size which overtakes the generally more competitive Bertrand
competition.
An early infinitely repeated game ‘grim’ strategy collusion analysis by Deneckere
(1983) found that the stability of collusion for differentiated substitute goods is
monotonically decreasing with product homogeneity in Cournot setting but nonmonotonic in Bertrand setting. Following the work of Singh and Vives (1984), Ross
(1992) analyzed the relationship between vertical and horizontal differentiation and the
sustainability of collusion between symmetric firms under Bertrand competition based on
the quadratic utility model. Assuming firms’ marginal costs are identical and set equal to
zero, a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of substitution and collusion
stability can obtain, a result consistent with that of Deneckere (1983) under price
competition. The reason being is greater homogeneity/heterogeneity can reduce cartel
stability by increasing the incentive to defect, but when the products are moderate
substitute’s collusion becomes easier. Under horizontal differentiation, however, Ross
(1992) found the stability of price collusion monotonically decreases with product
homogeneity.
6

Symeonidis (2002) analyze cartel stability in an infinitely repeated game among
multiproduct firms in a horizontally differentiated market under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition. In the model, it is assumed that the number of firms in the market
and the number of varieties that each firm produces are both exogenous. Via comparative
statics, the author generally finds that an increase in the number of varieties produced by
each firm makes collusion more difficult to sustain, except for the case where the number
of firms is small and the products are close substitutes.
Shaked and Sutton (1990) study a two stage game where Bertrand duopolists
consider product expansion within firm, the competition effects from the expansion and
entry deterrence in horizontally (Hotelling) and vertically differentiated (Bowley)
products. The authors generally find in a simultaneous game as two products become
closer substitutes, the value of product expansion decreases in relation to the increase in
competition for more similar products. The analysis demonstrates a multitude of
potential Nash equilibria, but none include the firms producing both products.
Fraja (1992) extends Shaked and Sutton’s (1990) work by explicitly considering
economies of scope and its impacts on which of two products are produced by two firms.
Furthermore, the author utilizes a variant of the Bowley model that allows for changing
intercepts and slopes of the respective demands as a function of the quantities produced
of each product. The author finds that Cournot competition in the second stage results in
a full range of product combination (market structure) possibilities. However, Bertrand
competition results in only a pure monopoly of both products or a pure monopoly by each
firm over each product. The main finding is that a decrease in economies of scope and an
increase in product substitutability induce a shortening of the product line.
7

Dobson and Waterson (1996) expand the vertical differentiated Bowley demand
model of Shaked and Sutton (1990) and Fraja (1992) to include consumer’s intrinsic
value of consumption from a specific firm, entry costs, economies of scope, as well as
Cournot competitors. They generally find that the added dimensions result in an array of
Nash equilibria in a simultaneous product choice game that depend on the parameters of
the model. Among other results, they find that for intense intra-product rivalry (close
substitutes) firms produce only one of the two products and for close complements firms
produce both products. They suggest that when two firms optimally produce both
products, collusion is beneficial. Asymmetric duopoly equilibria (one firm produces both
products while the rival produces one) are not observed under a symmetric cost
assumption. Economies of scope increase the incentive (likelihood) of observing both
firms producing both products.
Doraszelski and Gaganska (2006) study the determinants of firms’ market
segmentation strategies under spatial competition model assuming firms compete in
prices. A two stage game is considered. In the first stage, firms simultaneous decide on
their produce offerings; in the second stage, price competition takes place. In this
framework, they considered both the utility increases for some consumers (due to
increased fit) and the utility decreases for others (due to increased misfit)as a result
ofthefirms’ offering a targeted product instead of general purpose products. Their results
suggest that in addition to the degree of fit and misfit, the intensity of competition and the
fixed cost of offering an additional product determine firms’ market segmentation
strategies.

8

1.3

Economics Model
We first identify two stages of firm decision making. In the first stage, two firms

consider which of two differentiated products to produce in the market, A and/or B. In
stage two, firms consider their output choices for each product produced.
As noted in Bernheim and Winston (1990), the definition of the markets may be
identified by product and/or geographic delineations. For simplicity, we describe the
markets unidimensionally as products. Our modeling framework is most applicable for
analyzing a finite set of substitutable commodities, such as meats or sweeteners. For
example, consumers view differentiated products such as beef, pork, chicken and fish as
imperfect substitutes of a larger class of meat protein (Kinnucan el al., 1997).
We utilize the quadratic consumer utility function developed by Bowley (1924).
One of the strengths of the Bowley is that we need not distinguish between horizontal and
vertical differentiation, since the model can be used in both situations (Martin 2002).
One weakness of the model, however, is that the addition of products necessarily
increases the market size, a phenomena not always present in real markets. However,
when the product mix is fixed and has long been supplied by at least one seller, as in
commodities, the weakness is not as apparent.
In this section, we first provide three scenarios resulting in partial collusion at
only the first stage product space or only at the second stage output decision. A potential
cause of partial collusion is that though firms are long lived, different levels of
management and their goals may change over time. The final scenario we consider is
that of complete collusion from backward induction across both decision stages within a
trading period. We finish this section with a comparison and discussion of the required
9

minimum discount factors across product substitutability to maintain each type of
collusion, partial and complete.
1.3.1

Scenario 1 - Partial Collusion, Product Space Only
The first scenario we consider is when firm product line decisions are made by

long lived upper management who delegate output decisions to lower level management
with short time horizons. In such a case, upper management of each firm considers
product space collusion, each believing their rival’s lower level management will
competitively choose output. In this scenario, firms only consider taking three courses of
actions: produce product A only, produce B only, or produce both products A and B.
Rivals are assumed able to perfectly observe the product choices of rival firms at no cost.
To begin, the Bowley quadratic and strictly concave utility function of the
representative consumer for the two primary products is
1
U (qA , qB )  a(q A  qB )  b(q A2  2 q AqB  qB2 )  m . The quantities demanded of the two
2

differentiated products in the market are q A and qB , m represents all other goods with
price normalized to 1, and  represents the degree of substitution of the two products.
We consider only substitutes goods as we rely on the findings of Singh and Vives (1984)
and others that the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose quantity
when products are substitutes, as such, 0    1 . As   0 , the two products are
increasingly independent indicating multiproduct firms in this spectrum of products are
more akin to conglomerates. As   1 , the two products become closer substitutes
indicating the multiproduct firms experience increasing intra-firm (or intra-product)
rivalry. Finally, although the utility function can be generalized by allowing the positive
10

parameters a and b to vary across products, for clarity we do not pursue the
generalization.
From the quadratic utility, the corresponding inverse demand functions for each
product are pA  a  b(qA   qB ) and pB  a  b( qA  qB ) . A basic assumption of the
model is that firms are unable to identify consumer groups per se, thus reducing the
strategic choices of the firms to product space. We extend Bowley’s (1924) model by
assuming each firm has the option of producing any combination of the products within
the available product space. That is to say, each firm can produce product A, product B,
or both products, and the quantity produced of each product is based on the resulting
competition and substitutability of the products. The aggregate quantities of A and B
produced are qA  qA,1  qA,2  0 and qB  qB,1  qB,2  0 , where q A,i and q B ,i are the
quantities of product A and B produced by firm i  1, 2 . The prices paid by consumers for
products A and B are p A and p B .
We assume entry costs and economies of scope are symmetric across firms and
products, and without a loss in generality we set them equal to 0. As will become
apparent, our model does not require significant economies of scope to result in
competitive multiproduct (conglomerate) market structure as was required in Fraja
(1992)and Dobson and Waterson (1996). Variable costs are generated from fixed
proportion technology for products A and B, are constant and for simplicity assumed
symmetric. Therefore, cA  cB  c , where the costs of production c  a for positive
production. Admittedly, it cannot generally be assumed that production costs of
differentiated products are symmetric and leave this as a future extension.
11

We consider four general cases which map to the nine simultaneous game payoff
profiles summarized in table 1.1.The payoffs depicted in table 1.1 are static product
choice conditional on firms symmetrically choosing Cournot output into the
unforeseeable future. Detailed solutions to the payoffs depicted in table 1.1 and Nash
equilibrium are provided in Appendix A.
In the first case, let each firm consider producing only product A. When both
firms produce only A qB  0 , the game degenerates to a classic Cournot duopoly where
the representative firm’s objective function is

Max  A, j  [a  b(qA,i  qA, j )  c]qA,i , i  j . The resulting payoffs are depicted in the

q A ,i |qA ,2

top left and middle center cells of table 1.1.
In the second case, each firm considers producing each product separately, thus
the game degenerates to the cases analyzed in past research that uses a Bowley model.
Let Firm 1 consider producing only A and firm 2 producing only B. In this case, the
objective functions for the two firms are Max  A,1  [a  b(qA,1   qB,2 )  c]qA,1 and
q A ,1 |qB ,2

Max  B,2  [a  b( qA,1  qB,2 )  c]qB,2 ,where each firm’s payoffs are depicted in the

qB ,2 |q A ,1

middle left and middle top cells of table 1.1.
In the third case, we begin extending the assumption that firms are uniquely
identified by their product. Let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while firm 2
considers producing only A. The firms objective functions are now

Max

q A ,1 , qB ,1 |q A ,2

 A&B,1  [a  b(qA,1  qA,2   qB,1 )  c]qA,1  [a  b( (qA,1  qA,2 )  qB,1 )  c]qB,1 and

12

Max

qA ,2 |qA ,1 , qB ,1

 A,2  [a  b(qA,1  qA,2   qB,1 )  c]qA,2 resulting in the respective firm payoffs

depicted in the bottom left, top right, middle left and right cells of table 1.1.
In the fourth case, let each firm consider producing both products. The
representative firm’s objective function i  1, 2 is therefore

Max

q A , i , q B , i |q A , j , q B , j

 A&B ,i

 [a  b(q A,i  q A, j   (q B,i  q B, j ))  c]q A,i  [a  b( (q A,i  q A, j )  q B,i  q B, j )  c]q B,i ,
i  j , where each firm’s total payoffs are depicted in the bottom right cell of table 1.1.

Given the matrix of Cournot outcomes depicted in table 1.1, we prove in
Appendix A that producing both products is a unilateral strictly dominant strategy.
Therefore, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium {A&B | Cournot, A&B |
Cournot}.Interestingly, these results hold for multiproduct firm structure producing close
substitutes or, as classically defined, conglomeration across weak and independent
products.
We now solve for the conditions for upper management to maintain tacitly
collusive market segmentation as a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibria(SPNE), conditional on both firms maintaining Cournot output. We assume in
an infinitely repeated game firms follow the standard ‘grim’ or ‘trigger’ strategy.
Applicable to our setting, such a strategy dictates that each firm chooses to abstain from
producing the same product as their rival in any given trading period. If either firm enters
their product market in one period, the other firm punishes by permanently entering their
rival’s market.
For simplicity we will denote  c as the collusive market segmentation payoff,  d
as the defection payoff and  N is the Nash equilibrium payoff. Under a ‘grim’ strategy
13

the following condition must be satisfied for sustainable tacitly collusive market
segmentation (MS) is    MS 

 d  c
, where  and  MS is the required and minimum
d
N
 

discount factor to maintain tacitly collusive market segmentation. Because of the
symmetric outcomes of the model we ignore firm identifiers. By substituting the
corresponding payoffs from table 1.1 into the collusion condition we have

   MS 

5 2  12  16
. Notice that the minimum discount factor is a function of the
5(2   ) 2

substitutability parameter  and, due to firm and product symmetries, is independent of
cost and the slope (elasticity) of demand. Because there are two possible market
segmentations, {A, B} and {B, A}, we have the two pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
5 2  12  16
5 2  12  16
equilibria SPNE1  { A, B;  
} and SPNE2  {B, A;  
}.
5(2   )2
5(2   )2

Given 0    1 in the relevant game,  MS lies in the interval  MS  (11/15, 4 / 5] . These
results are graphically depicted in figure 1.1.
Given there are two SPNE, coordination at the initial stage of market
segmentation could realistically be a “noisy” process. For simplicity, we will assume
firms’ are able to coordinate by making ex ante public statements and firm 1 always
chooses product A first. In pure strategies,

 MS
8(  1)

 0  0    1 and is equal

5(2   )3

to zero otherwise. This result indicates the minimum discount factor that supports market
segmentation is monotonically decreasing as the degree of substitution of the two goods
increases. That is to say, as the goods become closer substitutes, it is easier for the firms
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to collude and segment the market. Alternatively, as goods become increasingly
independent, multiproduct production (conglomeration) is more likely.
Finally, it is quite apparent that each firm would like to produce A&B while the

(13  5 )(a  c)2
other produces only A or B. The payoff
in the top right and bottom left
36b(1   )
cells of table 1.1 are the highest possible payoff in the game. Therefore, if a first mover

i  1, 2 were able to create an entry cost  i   |{A & B, B} j   |{ A & B, A & B} j i  j , as
in Fraja (1992) and Dobson and Waterson (1996), the first mover could preempt entry
rendering collusive market segmentation a moot point. In such a game, other antitrust
issues of how firms erect the barriers to entry become focal.
1.3.2

Partial Collusion, Output Only
The second and third scenarios we consider are when making product line

adjustments or entering new markets is a long process so that the primary focus of upper
(and hence lower) management is on output competition. In such a case,
firms/management may only consider output collusion. Though there are nine potential
product combinations between the two firms, we will focus on the Nash (multiproduct
production (conglomeration)) and collusive (market segmentation) equilibria to provide
the first stage initial conditions for our analysis of output collusion.
1.3.2.1

Scenario 2 - Ex Ante Market Segmentation
In scenario two, we assume firms are producing separate products with no plans

of altering their product mix. This state may arise due to i) an existing competitive
advantage, ii)a locational constraint, or iii) the firm’s ability to tacitly collude over
15

product space prior to foreseeing their capabilities of output collusion. Assuming firms
are producing only one product, the payoffs from the collusive equilibrium {A, B} from
table 1.1 is the starting point for second stage tacit output collusion. Table 1.2
summarizes the payoff matrices from output decisions. Detailed solutions to the payoffs
depicted in table 1.2 and Nash equilibrium are provided in Appendix B.
Firms now consider their collusive joint profit maximization objective function

Max  A,1   B,2  (a  b(qA,1   qB,2 )  c)qA,1  (a  b( qA,1  qB,2 )  c)qB,2 . This is the

q A ,1 , qB ,2

discriminating monopolist’s objective function. The resulting collusive outcomes are
provided in the upper left cell and the defection payoffs are provided in the upper left and
lower right cells in table 1.2.We subsequently prove in Appendix B that there is a
unilateral incentive to deviate from the collusive output resulting in the unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
Given the relevant payoffs, the required minimum discount factor for output
collusion under ex ante market segmentation (EMS) following a ‘grim’ strategy requires

   EMS 

(2   )2
. Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
8   (8   )

SPNEEMS  {qA,1 

ac
(2   )2
 qB,2 ;  
}. Given 0    1 ,  EMS lies in the
2b(1   )
8   (8   )

interval  EMS  (1/ 2, 9 /17) . Comparing collusive market segmentation and noncooperative output to non-cooperative market segmentation and output collusion we find
the following relationship,  EMS   MS  0    1. Thus, collusion is easier to obtain
when markets are initially segmented. These relationships are graphically depicted in
figure 1.1.
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In pure strategies, the first order condition,

 EMS
4 (2   )

 0  0<  1

(8   (8   )) 2

and zero otherwise, reveals increasing product substitutability monotonically increases
the required discount factor to maintain collusion. This result is in stark contrast to our
previous results regarding collusion in product space alone.
This scenario most closely aligns with past collusion literature. Our result using
the Bowley model is consistent with price collusion in horizontally differentiated product
models where consumer tastes are heterogeneous and demand is piecewise linear (Chang,
1991; Ross, 1992). Additionally, we find similar results under quantity collusion
assuming a piecewise demand function (Deneckere, 1983). However, our result is in
contrast to the non-monotonic relationship found when assuming price collusion and a
quadratic utility function (Ross 1992). Furthermore, our result is in contrast to Häckner
(1994) who found that increasing product substitutability monotonically decreases the
required discount factor to maintain collusion. An important reason for the difference
between our result and Häckner (1994) lies in the fact that Häckner’s model explicitly
includes a continuous quality variable absent from the Bowley model. Häckner also
considers cost asymmetries resulting from quality differentiation, while we assume cost is
symmetric across products and firms.
1.3.2.2

Scenario 3 -Ex Ante Multiproduct Production (Conglomerate)
In the third scenario, we assume that conglomerate firms are producing both

products. This state may arise due to i) a lack of a competitive advantage, ii) no
locational constraint, or iii) falling prey to the competitive pressures to produce both
products before foreseeing their capabilities of output collusion. When firms are
17

producing both products, the payoffs from the Nash equilibrium {A&B, A&B} in table
1.1 is the starting point for output collusion. Table 1.3 summarizes the payoff matrices
from output decisions. Detailed solutions to the payoffs depicted in table 1.3 are provided
in Appendix C.
In this scenario, firms now consider their collusive joint profit maximization
objective function across both products
Max

q A ,1 , qB ,1 , q A ,2 , qB ,2

 A& B ,1   A& B ,2 

[a  c  b(q A,1  q A,2   (qB ,1  qB ,2 ))]q A,1  [a  c  b(qB ,1  qB ,2   (q A,1  q A,2 ))]qB ,1  (1.1)
[a  c  b(q A,1  q A,2   (qB ,1  qB ,2 ))]q A,2  [a  c  b(qB ,1  qB ,2   (q A,1  q A,2 ))]qB ,2

The collusive payoffs are provided in the upper left cell and the defection payoffs
are provided in the upper left and lower right cells in table 1.2. We prove in Appendix C
that there is a unilateral incentive to deviate from joint collusive output resulting in the
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
The required discount factor for output collusion under ex ante multiproduct
(conglomeration) (EMP) following a ‘grim’ strategy is constant    EMP 

9
. Because
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there is only one Nash equilibrium from the first stage game, there is only one pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the subsequent second stage game of
SPNEEMP  {A & B, A & B;   9 /17} .Comparing market segmentation alone and output

collusion under either ex ante multiproduct (conglomeration) or market segmentation we
find that  EMS   EMP   MS  0    1 . Thus, output collusion alone is easier to obtain
regardless of whether markets are initially segmented. These relationships are
graphically depicted in figure 1.1.
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In pure strategies notice that minimum required discount factor is independent of

 , a seemingly odd result. The reasons the degree of the substitutability of the products
no longer impact the minimum required discount factor to maintain collusion are 1)
consumers are entirely trapped and cannot flee higher prices, and 2) given firms are
already producing both products, they need not be concerned about the value of defection
(product expansion) relative to changes in competition for more similar/dissimilar
products. Interestingly, there is no distinction between conglomerate firms competing for
near independent goods and multiproduct firms producing close substitutes ability to
collude.
1.3.3

Scenario 4 - Complete Collusion across Product Space and Output
The previous partial collusive equilibria were based on the assumptions that

product space and output decisions may be carried out by various levels of management,
each with varying time horizons. If however, management decisions of the firm are fully
integrated and long lived, then the firm is able to fully foresee the benefits from collusion
across both decision stages, further assuming there are no constraints as to competitive
advantage or location.
In regards to observability of defection, we consider the case where firms make
product space decision in stage one, but either do not make them publically known until
placed in the market, or even if observable, the rival waits to verify product placement in
one period before defection is subsequently punished. In such a setting, the two stage
decision process reduces to a single game of paired choices (product space and quantity)
played once each period.
19

We discuss three possible defection cases. The first is where one firm is observed
to defect only on the output dimension, which we have already addressed in scenario two
above. The second is when one firm defects only on the product dimension. However,
given we assume the rival will not punish defection on product space without committed
production leaves us with the third case, defection in paired choices (product space and
quantity). Therefore, verifiable defection in product space cannot occur without
defection in output, especially in the market entered. To maintain collusion across both
product space and output, the within period backward induction process across decision
stages by firms must consider credible punishments, and optimal defection strategies.
In regards to defection, we find that the defector has two strategies available
contingent upon the range of product substitutability. The first defection strategy takes

(a  c)2 (2   ) 2
,
place only at the output decision stage resulting in a defection payoff of
16b(1   )2
(payoff located in the upper/lower right/left cells in table 1.2, scenario 2). The second
defection strategy is across both decision stages. Appendix D provides the derivation of
defection per period payoffs for table 1.4. We find when the colluding firm produces the
monopoly output within its believed segmented market, results in a set of defection and
collusion payoffs of  defection,i

(a  c)2 (5  4 )

i  j . If the defector is rational, the firm
16b(1   )2

will compare these two payoffs and choose an optimal one time defection.
We now compare the two defection payoffs and note that  is the primary variable
determining the relative size of the defection payoffs. We find that

(a  c)2 (5  4 ) (a  c) 2 (2   ) 2

 0    1. Therefore, for the exception of perfect
16b(1   )2
16b(1   ) 2
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substitutes we find the optimal defection includes both entering the rival’s previously
segmented market and producing Cournot output. In table 1.4 we provide the respective
defection payoffs in the lower right and upper left cells.
Next we consider credible punishment. If a firm is observed to cheat in only the
second stage, it was the case in scenario 2 that the optimal punishment by the rival in the
next period is to produce its Cournot output in only its segmented product market.
However, under full collusion the second stage subgame Nash equilibrium does not
represent a credible punishment, but rather the paired strategies {A&B, Cournot; A&B,
Cournot}. Therefore, the only credible punishment for verifiable defection in product
space and output results in symmetric payoffs of

2(a  c) 2
(bottom right payoffs in table
9b(1   )

1.1, scenario 1).
Table 1.4 summarizes the relevant payoffs of the game played each period. The
collusive payoffs from scenario 2constitute full collusion payoffs in the upper left cell.
The credible punishment just discussed constitutes full defection in the bottom right cell.
We prove in Appendix D that there is a unilateral incentive to deviate from maintaining
market segmentation and monopoly output resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium{A&B, Cournot; A&B, Cournot}.
Following a ‘grim’ strategy, the required discount factor for both market
segmentation and output collusion requires    Full 

9
.Therefore, the subgame
13  4


ac
9 
 qB ,2 ;  
perfect Nash equilibrium is SPNE   A, B, q A,1 
 . Given
2b(1   )
13  4 


0    1 ,  Full lies in the interval 9 /13, 9 /17  .
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By comparing all partial collusion scenarios to full collusion we find that

 EMS   EMP   Full   MS  0    1 . Thus, output collusion alone is easier to obtain
than coordinating over product space. Taking the first order condition,

 Full
36

 0  0    1 ,reveals that increasing product substitutability

(13  4 )2
monotonically decreases the required discount factor to maintain complete collusion.
These results are graphically represented in figure 1.1.
1.3.4

Summary of the Minimum Required Discount Factors for Partial and
Complete Collusion
Given our modeling framework, it appears that product space collusion is more

difficult to attain than output collusion. Overall, as long as product space is major
consideration of collusion, closer substitutes stabilizes collusion. Alternatively, as long
as output is the focal point of collusion, closer substitutes weakly destabilizes collusion.
However, output, rather than market segmentation, collusion is generally easier to obtain
and more so as product markets become increasingly weaker substitutes.
It is important to note that output collusion among multiproduct (conglomerate)
firms results in the same payoffs as output collusion after market segmentation. To
achieve the same level of collusion, and hence profit, firms/management that first
segment the market then later consider restricting quantity have two hurdles of
coordination to overcome in the long run. However, if firms/management have a high
‘enough’ discount factor to collusively segment the market in the first place, they would
necessarily be able to collude over output at a later date. On the other hand, if
firms/management have low ‘enough’ discount factor and cannot initially segment the
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market, the resulting multiproduct (conglomerate) firms would experience nearly the
same level of difficulty to collude in output as segmented firms.
1.4

Conclusions
By accounting for a two stage decision process, we were able to evaluate the

impact of the firms’ ability to collusively segment a differentiated product market, an
important issue for antitrust agencies. Our first important findings is that under partial
collusion, i) collusive product market segmentation is unlikely to occur due to the value
of entry, and ii) multiproduct competition (conglomeration) and output collusion is more
likely to occur than collusive product market segmentation. Secondly, when firms are
able to consider collusion over both product space and output, maintaining market
segmentation is more likely to occur as products become close substitutes. Lastly, if
firms are found to have collusively segmented the product market, but not over quantity,
the impacts are not as severe as with output collusion. However, output collusion is a
natural progression if firms are able to coordinate over product space.
Given the output collusive payoffs are the same post market segmentation and
multiproduct (conglomeration) market structure, even firms with sufficiently high
discount factors to initially segment the market may want to consider the overall ease of
collusion. For instance, segmented industries must monitor entry and output competition,
as well as consumer perceptions of the differentiability of their products. Though we find
output collusion is more likely after market segmentation than not, under more realistic
informational assumptions our results suggest collusion may be more likely among
multiproduct (conglomerate) firms. For instance, firms need not be concerned about
entry, as their rival is already in the market, and need not be concerned about adequately
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estimating the consumers’ view of the differentiability of their products. Therefore,
monitoring costs would more likely be lower in the case of a conglomerate industry.
Consequently, periodic distortions in the market, changes in consumer preferences and/or
imperfections in monitoring that may lead to competitive disagreements that are more
likely overcame if the firms are able to focus on one rather than two product dimensions.
In relation to the literature, we find that producing both products can be a
symmetric and unique Nash equilibrium without requiring significant entry costs and
economies of scope (Fraja, 1992; Dobson and Waterson, 1996).Furthermore, for the
exception of perfect substitutes, is independent of the degree of substitutability. These
results are in stark contrast with earlier two stage Bertrand models by Shaked and Sutton
(1990)where multiple product mix equilibria are found but firms never produce both
products for the exception of complements(Shaked and Sutton, 1990).The discrepancy is
due to the Cournot assumption in our framework. Under Bertrand-Nash competition, the
prices would fall to marginal cost where firms will not produce both products.
Our results under ex ante market segmentation are consistent with the findings of
horizontally differentiated products and Bertrand competitors analyzed by Chang (1991)
and Ross (1992). However, this result is inconsistent with Ross’s (1992) non-monotonic
result based on the quadratic utility model and Häckner’s (1994) analysis on a vertical
differentiation model. One reason being is that firms must first overcome the competitive
pressure to product both products in the first stage. More interestingly, if firms are
unable to segment the market in the first stage, the results indicate that the stability of
collusion is independent of product substitutability for conglomerates. The reason being
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is that product substitutability is only an intra-firm competition concern leaving only
aggregate output as the target for collusion.
Finally, our modeling approach is easily extended in obvious and much needed
ways. For instance, the assumption of symmetric production costs for each product
should be relaxed. For example in the meat processing industry, beef is significantly
more expensive to process than chicken, thus altering the incentives of the high cost firm
to refrain from entering the low cost industry. Interestingly, if one or the other product is
more profitable due to asymmetries in the size of each market, demand elasticity’s and/or
production costs, our intuition is that for a firm to be willing to continue producing only
the less profitable product would require further assumptions about entry costs, product
expertise or overt (collusive) compensation. Furthermore, an extension of our modeling
framework to analyze multiproduct mergers could consider both economies of scope and
increases in the inelasticity of residual aggregate demand when firms produce a wider
range of complimentary/substitute products (Bailey and Friendlander, 1982; Hausman et
al., 1994).
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Table 1.1

First Stage Product Choice Conditional on Cournot Output Competition
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Table 1.2

Second Stage Output Choice Conditional on Prior Market Segmentation

Table 1.3

Second Stage Output Choice Conditional on Prior Competitive
Multiproduct (Conglomeration)
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Table 1.4

Joint Product Space and Output Choices
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Figure 1.1

Comparison of Minimum Required Discount Factor to Maintain Collusion
as a Function of Product Substitutability
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECTS OF WIC PROGRAM AND PEERS EFFECTS ON BREASTFEEDING
ACTIVITIES
2.1

Introduction
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in breastfeeding from the public

health prospective. Raising the incidence and duration of breastfeeding has been at the
heart of many public health campaigns (Wolf, 2013). It is generally believed that breast
milk is a superior nutrition source for infants, and breastfeeding is beneficial to both
infants and the mothers (Belfield and Kelly, 2012; Turck et. al, 2013). Therefore, raising
breastfeeding rates across the United States earned the status of a priority goal for Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Both American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)
and the World Health Organization (WHO) recommend that infants be exclusively
breastfed for the first 6 months of life to achieve optimal growth; and continued
breastfeeding is recommended after the first six months.2 Healthy People 2020 set
several new goals on the breastfeeding rate and breastfeeding durations, which include

2

http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/breastfeeding/conditioninfo/Pages/recommendations.aspx. It is recommended

to continue breastfeeding until the infant is 1 year old and up to 2 years old or beyond by AAP and WTO, respectively.
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increasing the breastfeeding initiation rate to 81.9%. The objectives of exclusively
breastfeeding rates at month 3 and month 6 are 46.2% and 25.5%, respectively. 3
However, the breastfeeding initiation and the breastfeeding rates at months 3 and
6 in the United States remain stagnant and have fallen short of the guidelines. In 1970,
the breastfeeding initiation rate in the United States was 26.5%; After a slight decline
followed by a steady increase, it rose to 51.5% in 1990. It then increased to 68.4% in
2000 and 75% in 2010.4 In 2013, the breastfeeding initiation rate was 76.5%, and the
exclusively breastfeeding rates at month 3 and month 6 were 37.7% and 16.4%,
respectively5, which did not meet the Healthy People 2020 objectives, despite the
recommendations and active public health campaigns carried out by those organizations.
Reasons for the low breastfeeding rates in the United States include returning to work,
mother's perception of father's attitude, and uncertainty regarding the quantity of breast
milk (Arora et. al., 2000).
The WIC program was established with the aim to provide supplemental
nutritious food, nutrition education, counseling, screening, and referrals to other health,
welfare and social services to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and
children under age five who are at nutritional risk. Since its inception in 1972, the WIC
program promotes and supports breastfeeding by educating mothers about the benefits of

3Data

source:

http://www.usbreastfeeding.org/LegislationPolicy/FederalPoliciesInitiatives/HealthyPeople2020BreastfeedingObjectiv
es/tabid/120/Default.aspx
The breastfeeding rates for years 1970 through 1998 are from Ross Mothers Survey. Data source:

4

http://kellymom.com/fun/trivia/ross-data/; the rates after 1998 are from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Data source: http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/data/index.htm.
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/2013breastfeedingreportcard.pdf

5
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breastfeeding their children, providing peer counseling and extensive benefits to
breastfeeding mothers, including enhanced food packaging, longer participation in the
program, and providing breast pump and nursing supplements, etc. At the same time,
infant formula is provided to the infants who are not fully breastfed. In certain cases,
when prescribed by a physician, special infant formulas and medical food may be
provided.
It is conjectured that the program has two countervailing effects on breastfeeding
activities. Although the provision of free formula is necessary to promote adequate
nutrition among infants whose mothers choose not to breastfeed, it induces a substitution
effect which decreases the probability of breastfeeding initiation and duration; that is, a
lower (zero) price for formula increases the cost of breastfeeding. However, since WIC
promotes breastfeeding as the optimal source of nutrition for infants, they provide
counseling, education, and additional benefits to breastfeeding mothers in order to
increase demand for breastfeeding (an income effect). Whether the substitution or
income effect is larger is an empirical question that has yielded mixed evidence in
previous studies. A systematic review done by Hedberg (2013) shows that WIC-related
issues can be one of the barriers to breastfeeding in WIC population, but peer counseling,
improved communication between hospital lactation consultants and WIC staff, breastpump programs, and discouraging routine formula provision in the hospital and by WIC
are likely to increase the breastfeeding initiation rate for WIC participants. Therefore, it is
intriguing to investigate how the program as a whole affects women’s decisions to offer
breast milk to their infants.
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Numerous studies in economic literature attempt to answer the question of
whether WIC participation has an impact on breastfeeding. We are not trying to separate
the substitution and income effects, we examine whether the substitution or income effect
dominate. We contribute to the literature by estimating the effects of prenatal WIC
participation on breastfeeding using duration analysis techniques and national-level data,
collected from May 2005 through June 2007. We control for common demographic
characteristics, and estimate the models both with and without peer effects, which are
unique to our data. For our estimation sample, we exclude income ineligible WIC
nonparticipants.
Since we find positive significant effects of peers on breastfeeding activities, we
focus on the peer effects in the second part of the chapter. There are numerous studies
examining the effect of peer counseling provided by the WIC program on breastfeeding
activities, but none of them examines how the woman’s breastfeeding decisions are
affected by the breastfeeding decisions of her peers. Although it is widely recognized in
social sciences that one person’s behavior often influences the behavior of neighbors,
classmates, colleagues, peers, etc, this phenomenon, known as peer effects, has not been
studied on breastfeeding decisions.
Our study intends to fill the gap in the literature by examining the peer effects in
breastfeeding activities. The data employed is Infant Feeding Practice Survey II (IFPS II).
This dataset provides detailed information on both mothers and infants, including the
mothers’ demographic and residential characteristics, the infants’ health condition, the
foods fed to infants, the WIC participation status, as well as information sources about
breastfeeding, such as initiation and duration of breastfeeding. More importantly, it gives
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information on the breastfeeding decisions of the respondents’ friends in the prenatal
survey, which allows us to extend our model by including the peer effects variables in the
model. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze the effect of WIC
participation status on breastfeeding activities using duration analysis techniques based
on a national level dataset. It is also the first study to include peer effect characteristics in
the model and analyze the breastfeeding decisions in the context of social interactions.
Based on the sample excluding income ineligible non-participants, we find that
the prenatal WIC participation status does not have significant effect on breastfeeding
activities, which is consistent with many previous studies (Jiang et al. 2010; Marshall et
al. 2013; Ma et al., 2014). Peer effects do not affect breastfeeding initiation significantly
but have significant positive effects on both partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations,
and peer effects appear only after a critical mass of the prevalence of breastfeeding in a
peer group are achieved. The magnitude of the peer effects on each individual is different
and it increases as the individual’s propensity to breastfeed increases. When all
observations without missing values are employed, the results show that knowing more
than five peers who breastfed increases the probability of initiating breastfeeding by 3.7%
and the likelihood of any breastfeeding at months 3 and 6 by more than 15%. It also
increases the partial and exclusive breastfeeding duration by 9 and 3 weeks, respectively.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
background information about the WIC program and the literature review on the effects
of WIC program on the breastfeeding behavior and the peer effects. Data, estimation
techniques, and results are presented in Section3. Section 4 concludes.
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2.2

Literature review
Numerous studies examine the factors that affect breastfeeding activity. Our focus

is the effects of WIC program on women’s breastfeeding decision, the peer effects on
breastfeeding activities are also examined. In this section, we provide the existing
literatures on both the effect of WIC participation and peer effects on breastfeeding
activities. The first subsection discusses the benefits and costs of breastfeeding.
Subsection two provides a background of the WIC program and the literature on the
effects of the program on breastfeeding activity. In the last subsection, we provide the
previous studies on peer effects in the social science field as well as the definition of peer
effects, which fills a gap in the existing literature.
2.2.1

Benefits and costs of breastfeeding
The health benefits of breastfeeding for both children and mothers are widely

recognized and accepted (Belfield and Kelly, 2012; Turck et. al, 2013). Breast milk has
many biological properties and contains hormones, growth factors, cytokines,
immunocompetent cells, etc, which makes it a superior nutrition source for infants.
Breastfeeding is associated with a lower risk of acute otitis media, gastroenteritis and
diarrhea, severe lower respiratory infections, asthma, sudden infant death syndrome
(Salone, et.al, 2013; Chen and Rogan, 2004; Turck et. al, 2013), a lower incidence of
obesity during childhood and adolescence (Salone et. al, 2013; Turck et. al, 2013;
Armstrong and Reilly, 2002), lower risk of child disability (Wehby, 2014), as well as a
lower blood pressure and cholesterolemia in adulthood (Turck et. al, 2013). It has also
been found that breastfeeding is associated with enhanced performance on tests of
cognitive development and better academic outcomes (Horward and Fergusson, 1998;
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Kramer et. al, 2008; Del Bono & Rabe, 2011; Borra et. al, 2012; Turck et. al, 2013).
Therefore, increasing the prevalence of breastfeeding could lead to a lower incidence of
childhood diseases and conditions during the first 2 to 3 years of life in at-risk infants
(Turck et. al, 2013), improve health outcomes of the young generation, and even improve
future human capital (Harder et. al, 2005; Saarinen and Kajosaari, 1995; Homer and
Simpson, 2007, Belfield and Kelly, 2012). For mothers, breastfeeding is associated with a
decreased risk of breast and ovarian cancer as well as osteoporosis in the postmenopausal
period (Turck et. al, 2013). Return to prepregnancy weight also occurs earlier in
breastfeeding mothers during the 6 months following delivery (Turck et. al, 2013).
The employer benefits, which are derived from the health benefits of
breastfeeding to infants and mothers, are not negligible. The illness rates of breastfeeding
babies are substantially lower than those fed on infant formula. The low illness rates
benefits both employers and mothers by lowering health care costs (Ball and Wright,
1999) and reducing absenteeism (Cohen et.al, 1995).
The health benefits of breastfeeding to infants and mothers lead to benefits to
society as well. The direct economic benefits (cost savings) include the reduced costs to
buy infant formula and the decreased medical costs and the expenses associated with an
illness; the indirect costs reduced include forgone time and earnings of parents attending
to an ill child. Ball and Bennett (2001) analyze the economic impact of breastfeeding on
infant and parent, health care payer, employer, and society. They conclude that
breastfeeding results in cost savings for all parties mentioned above; thus, promoting
breastfeeding can be a source of significant cost saving for the United States economy
(Ball & Bennett, 2001). A study performed by United States Breastfeeding Committee
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(2002) indicates that every 10% increase in breastfeeding rates among WIC participants
would save WIC $750,000 per year. Compared with formula-feeding, each infant
enrolled in WIC who was breastfed saved $478 in WIC costs and Medicaid expenditures
during the first 6 months of the infant’s life (Montgomery and Splett, 1997). An analysis
of breastfeeding and formula feeding indicates that if the prevalence of exclusive
breastfeeding in United States increased from current rates (64% in-hospital, 29% at 6
months) to those recommended by the Surgeon General (75% and 50%, respectively), the
minimum cost savings could be $3.6 billion (Weimer, 2001).
However, the benefits of breastfeeding do not come without costs. Women who
breastfeed their babies devote time and possibly pay an economic penalty in earnings.
Mothers may not initiate or may stop breastfeeding due to a number of reasons, including
returning to work, lack of support from family and society, cultural attitudes, insufficient
knowledge on breastfeeding, and uncertainty regarding the quantity of breast milk (Arora
et. al., 2000; Guttman& Zimmerman, 2000; Kong & Lee, 2004). While each reason can
be important for a specific woman, returning to work is the most frequently cited and
commonly reported reason for giving up breastfeeding. Recent decades have witnessed
the rapid increase in female participation in the labor force. During the past 50 years,
female labor force participation rate rose from 38% to 57%.6 Working and breastfeeding
are incompatible to some extent since both activities need to take critical hours from the
day and both work and feeding schedules may have limited flexibility. Therefore,
breastfeeding mothers may pay an economic penalty in earnings compared to formula-

6

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/LNS11300002.txt
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feeding mothers after childbirth. Based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, Rippeyoung and Noonan (2012) show that women who breastfeed for 6 months or
longer suffer more severe and prolonged earnings losses than do mothers who breastfeed
for shorter durations or not at all. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
passed in 1993 entitles approximately half of the employed women up to 12 weeks of
maternity leave (Han et al., 2009; Ruhm, 1997), not all eligible women choose to take the
unpaid leave due to economic factors.7 The situation is even worse for those women in
the most disadvantaged positions in the labor market (i.e. single mothers) since they
cannot afford to take extended unpaid maternity leave and may not have workplaces that
are supportive of breastfeeding. Therefore, the employment-related factors can constrain
infant feeding options. Many studies show that full time working mothers are less likely
to breastfeed and breastfeed for shorter duration than the mothers working part time or
not employed (Lindberg, 1996; Fein & Roe, 1998; Ryan et. al., 2006; Mandal et. al.,
2010). Existing literature also shows that returning to work after child birth is associated
with shorter breastfeeding duration (Kurinij et. al., 1989; Berger et.al., 2005; Chatterji &
Frick, 2005; Mandal et. al., 2010). Increased maternity leave leads to health benefits for
infants (Rossin, 2011) and it is likely an effective policy to achieve breastfeeding goals
(Roe et. al., 1999; Berger et.al., 2005; Baker and Milligan 2008; Mandal et. al., 2010;
Mandal et. al., 2014).

7

According to United States department of labor, to be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must work for a public

agency or a private sector employer with 50 or more employees for at least 20 workweeks. The woman must work at a
location where at least 50 employees are employed at the location or within 75 miles of the location for at least 12
months and have worked no less than 1,250 hours.
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2.2.2

Literature on the effects of WIC program on breastfeeding

2.2.2.1

The Program Background
The WIC program, administered at the Federal level by the Food and Nutrition

Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, was established as a pilot program in
1972 and has been permanent since 1974. The program provides supplemental nutritious
food, nutrition education, counseling, and screening and referrals to other health, welfare
and social services to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and children
under age five who are at nutritional risk. The main purpose of the program is to improve
health outcomes of the low-income participants by providing nutrition and helping
establish healthy nutrition habits. The program is available in all 50 States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Northern Marianas,
and 34 Indian Tribal Organization.
2.2.2.1.1

The overall effects of the program

Most studies show that the WIC program has significant positive effects on
mothers and their children. It is found that WIC participation positively affects the overall
health of children (Carlson and Senauer, 2003). It is associated with reductions in low
birth weight (Devaney, 1992; Bitler and Currie, 2005; Figlio et al, 2009; Hoynes et. al,
2009, Hoynes et. al, 2011; Currie & Rajani, 2014) and increases the intake of iron, zinc,
potassium, and fiber (Rose et al, 1998; Yen, 2010). For the effects on pregnant women,
studies (Schramm, 1986; Devaney et al, 1990; Devaney, 1992) show that the prenatal
participation in the program is associated with lower Medicaid costs for themselves and
their babies. They claim that for each dollar spent on the prenatal WIC program, the state
saves $1.77 to $3.13 in health care costs.
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2.2.2.1.2

Participants of the program

The WIC program is designed to decrease the risk of poor birth outcomes and to
improve the health of participants during critical times of growth and development. When
the program was enacted in 1972, participation was limited to breastfeeding mothers and
their children. The eligibility has been extended to include formula-feeding infants and
their mothers since 1994.The participants have to fall into one of the following
categories: pregnant women; postpartum mothers, either breastfeeding (up to 1 year after
baby’s birth) or not breastfeeding (up to 6 months after baby’s birth); infants; and
children under age 5.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the total number of WIC participants has steadily increased
except for slight declines in late 1990’s and since 2010. It peaked in 2010 at more than 9
million participants. About half of all infants born in United States are enrolled in the
program. In Fiscal Year 2013, the program served 8,662,805 participants, among which
2,046,627 were women, 2,035,533 were infants, and 4,580,645 were children under age
5.8
2.2.2.1.3

Eligibility for the program

To be eligible for WIC benefits in the State of their residence, pregnant or
postpartum women, infants or children must meet the state agency’s income requirement
and at the same time be at nutritional risk. It is required for the applicants’ gross income
to be at or below 185 percent of the Federal poverty income level. However, eligible
participants might have income above 185 percent of the poverty level and still be

8

Data Source: http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program
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eligible due to the following reasons. First, the individuals who are eligible to receive
SNAP, Medicaid, TANF benefits, or to participate in certain other State-administered
programs are automatically eligible for the WIC program. In addition, people whose
annual income is above 185 percent of the poverty level but experiencing a temporary
decline in monthly earnings may be eligible for participation (Oliveira & Frazao, 2009).
Nutritional risk, evaluated by a health care professional, presumes medical-based
or dietary-based conditions. The medical-based conditions may include anemia, being
underweight, or history of poor pregnancy outcomes, while the dietary-based ones
include poor diet and nutrition habits or failure to achieve Dietary Guidelines for
Americans. Literature shows that in practice, nutrition risk criterion is a nonbinding
restriction since all would-be participants satisfy at least one of the nutritional risk criteria
(Ver Ploeg & Betson, 2003; Tiehen & Jacknowitz; 2008; Oliveira &Frazao, 2009).
Therefore, in this chapter, the eligible WIC non-participants are distinguished based on
the income requirement, which is consistent with existing literature (Jensen, 2012; Ma et.
al, 2014).
2.2.2.1.4

Benefits provided by the program

The WIC program is state-run and is administered by 90 WIC State agencies
through approximately 47,000 authorized retailers at the state level. The extent to which
breastfeeding benefits are offered varies state from state, but generally the benefits
received by the participants fall into the following categories:
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2.2.2.1.4.1

Supplemental food packages

Supplemental food packages are designed to meet the nutritional needs of lowincome pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and children under age five who are at
nutritional risk. The packages are one of the ways WIC affects the dietary quality and
habits of participants. The first comprehensive revisions to the food packages since 1980
were implemented in 2007 and finalized in 2014 after considering public comments. The
new food packages expand the access to healthy fruits and vegetables, whole grains, and
low-fat dairy to meet the diverse nutritional needs of mothers and their young children
better.
The maximum monthly allowance of supplemental foods for infants and mothers
set by federal is shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively. The packages include
whole grains, milk, peanut butter, fruits, vegetables, and iron fortified cereals.
Exclusively breastfeeding mothers and infants receive greater amounts of food and a
higher dollar value for fruits and vegetables. Less infant formula is provided to partially
breastfeeding infants so that they may receive the benefits of breast milk. Also, the
women who do not breastfeed are eligible for the program up to 6 months postpartum,
but breastfeeding (either partially or exclusively) women are eligible for the program for
a longer period (up to 1 year postpartum). The food packages can vary since states have
some flexibility in designing the packages for participants.
2.2.2.1.4.2

Breastfeeding promotion and support

WIC acknowledges that breastfeeding is the optimal nutrition source for infants. It
is aimed, among other things, at increasing the prevalence of breastfeeding among the
program participants. All pregnant participants are encouraged to breastfeed unless
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medically contraindicated. Since its inception in 1974, efforts have been made to
encourage breastfeeding among the program participants. Over time the program has
enhanced breastfeeding promotion. Starting from 1989, WIC agencies are required to
spend a specified minimum amount of funds on breastfeeding promotion and support.
Breastfeeding promotion is now conducted in the following ways:
-

Providing information about breastfeeding through counseling and education
materials.

-

Follow-up support of breastfeeding mothers through peer-counselors.

-

Breastfeeding mothers are given a higher level of priority for program
certification and are eligible to participate in WIC longer compared to nonbreastfeeding ones.

-

Enhanced food package (greater quantity and variety of foods) for exclusively
breastfeeding mothers.

2.2.2.1.4.3

Provision of breast pumps, breast shells, and nursing supplements.
Other benefits

Other benefits provided by WIC program include nutrition education, counseling,
and referrals to other health, welfare and social services. Nutrition education is another
way of affecting the dietary quality and habits of participants. The topics of nutrition
education include healthy eating, appropriate infant feeding, and breastfeeding.
Therefore, as mentioned in a previous context, it is also a way of promoting breastfeeding
activities among WIC participants. The program offers the participants at least two
nutrition education classes during each 6-month period, which help them understand their
specific nutrition needs and assist the participates in achieving a positive change in
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dietary and physical activity habits. Counseling and referrals to health care and other
services are also provided by the program.
2.2.2.1.5

Costs of the program

WIC is a Federal grant program and receives federal funding from the US
Department of Agriculture. The costs of the program consist of two components, food
costs and Nutrition Services and Administrative (NSA) costs.
Food costs are associated with the food packages provided to the participants.
About 70% of the total costs of the program contribute to the food costs each year. To
minimize cost, WIC state agencies have competitively bid infant formula rebate contracts
with formula manufacturers, according to which a state agency agrees to provide one
brand of infant formula in exchange for a rebate from the manufacturer. The brand of
infant formula provided varies by state, depending on which manufacturer secures the
contract. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013,the federal costs of the WIC program totaled $6.48
billion, $4.5 billion of which were food costs. The average monthly post-rebate food
package costs across all WIC participant categories were $43.26.
NSA costs are the costs associated with nutrition services provided by the
program and the administration costs. Nutrition services include nutrition education,
preventative and coordination services (such as health care), and promotion of
breastfeeding and immunization. The NSA costs are usually presented together. On
average, they have represented 28 percent of federal WIC costs since 2001, among which
9 percent of federal WIC funds are spent on program administration, with about 19
percent being spent on nutrition education, breastfeeding support, and other services such
as smoking cessation counseling and support (Neuberger, 2011).
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The food and NSA costs of WIC program from 1974 to 2014 are shown in Figure
2.2.
2.2.2.2

Previous studies on the effects of WIC program on breastfeeding
Despite the fact that the impact of the WIC program on breastfeeding behavior of

low-income women is of high practical importance, relatively few studies attempt to
address this question, and the previous literature indicates that the effects of the program
on breastfeeding rate and/or breastfeeding duration is controversial. Some research
suggests that the WIC program reduces breastfeeding rates (Chatterji et al., 2002; Ryan
and Zhou, 2006; Rose et al, 2006; Ma et. al 2014), while some researchers find WIC
participation has positive effect on breastfeeding activities (Chatterji and Brooks-Gunn,
2004) when WIC participation is combined with breastfeeding advice (Schwartz et al.,
1995) or the exposure to WIC participation increases (Metallinos-Katsaras et al., 2015).
Rose et. al (2006) calculate the monetary benefits (the values of food package) for
the exclusive formula-feeding and exclusive breastfeeding options, concluding that the
total value for the exclusive formula-feeding is more than twice of that of the exclusive
breastfeeding option, which provides economic incentives to formula feed. Using data
from Ross Mothers Survey (RMS), they find a significantly negative effect of the formula
incentive on state-level breastfeeding rates among WIC participants for both in-hospital
level and at month 6.
Jensen (2012) uses the National Immunization Survey (NIS) public use dataset
and compares the breastfeeding initiation and duration of WIC participants with WICeligible nonparticipants and WIC-ineligible nonparticipants at both the state and national
levels. At the national level, he finds WIC participation has a negative influence on
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breastfeeding initiation and durureation; At the state level though, he finds WIC
participation in most states does not have a significant effect on breastfeeding initiation
and duration. He finds participation has a significant negative effect on breastfeeding
initiation in 13 states and breastfeeding duration in 10 states.
Metallinos-Katsaras et al. (2015) examine the association between the timing of
WIC entry and the breastfeeding activities, including breastfeeding initiation, mean
duration, and 3, 6, 12 month durations. Their sample includes all women certified in the
Massachusetts WIC program between the years 2001 through 2009, but is limited to
those who have singleton live births and complete breastfeeding and covariate data. Their
results indicate that greater exposure to WIC services is associated with higher
breastfeeding initiation rate, greater breastfeeding durations, and higher probability of
breastfeeding at 3, 6 and 12 months. This conclusion is in contrast to the findings of ZiolGuest and Hernandez (2010), which indicate the negative relationship between entry into
WIC program in the first trimester of pregnancy and the likelihood of initiation and
duration of breastfeeding.
Marshall et al. (2013) examine how the association between prenatal WIC
participation and breastfeeding activities varies by race/ethnicity in Mississippi. Based on
the data from the 2004-2008 Mississippi Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System,
they find a negative relationship between WIC participation and breastfeeding initiation
rate among white mothers, but not blacks. They conclude that WIC participation is not
associated with breastfeeding duration (breastfeeding for at least 10 weeks) for women of
either race.
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Although most studies in this area treat WIC participation as an exogenous
variable, such an approach may be controversial as it fails to account for the potential
endogeneity between WIC participation and breastfeeding decisions. The decision of
whether to participate in WIC and breastfeeding decisions may be made simultaneously.
Given the fact that WIC participants are generally socioeconomically disadvantaged
compared with non-participants, the exogeneity of WIC participation is a concern when
we examine the effects of the program. The studies that account for the self-selection into
the WIC program are Schwartz et al. (1995), Chatterjiet. al (2002) and Jiang et. al (2010).
However, the conclusion about the endogeneity is controversial.
Schwartz et al. (1995) use retrospective cross-sectional data from the 1988
National Maternal and Infant Health Survey (NMIHS) to estimate the effects of WIC
participation on the initiation and duration of breastfeeding. The authors control the
selection bias by estimating the correlation in unmeasured factors that affect prenatal
WIC participation and breastfeeding initiation and duration in a multivariate model. They
find that breastfeeding advice provided by WIC is crucial to explain the effects of the
program. Mothers who participated in WIC during pregnancy and received no
breastfeeding advice are less likely to initiate breastfeeding than similar nonparticipants.
On the other hand, prenatal WIC participation combined with breastfeeding advice
increases the likelihood of breastfeeding compared to nonparticipants. However, they
find that neither WIC participation nor breastfeeding advice has a significant impact on
breastfeeding duration.
Jiang et al. (2010) control for the self-selection of women into the WIC program,
conjecturing that the observed negative association between WIC participation and
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breastfeeding initiation or duration may be spurious, as WIC participants may share some
unobserved characteristics that negatively affect breastfeeding. As a result, the negative
estimates of WIC participation reflect the effect of those factors rather than the program
itself. Using the method of propensity scores and fixed-effects, Jiang et al. (2010) find no
evidence of the adverse effects of WIC participation on breastfeeding activity. This study
indicates that what reduces breastfeeding for WIC participants might be their socioeconomically disadvantaged characteristics, not participating in the WIC program itself.
Bitler and Currie (2005) estimates the effect of WIC program on birth outcomes.
The study evaluates the selection bias using rich data from the national Pregnancy Risk
Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS), based on which a negative selection bias is
found. By estimating two-stage least squares (2SLS) models using state-level program
characteristics as instruments to correct for the selection bias, the study shows that WIC
participation is associated with better birth outcomes. It also indicates that the program
has negative effect on breastfeeding initiation.
Wang (2013) estimates the effects of WIC program on breastfeeding activities
after controlling for the selection bias in the first essay of the dissertation. The study is
based the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) data which was
collected by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), US Department of
Education. The effects of both prenatal and postnatal WIC participation on breastfeeding
are assessed. After controlling for selection bias by using differences-in-differences
method, it is found that postpartum entrants are less likely to breastfed at month 6 and
have shorter breastfeeding durations but more likely to initiate breastfeeding than nonparticipants.
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Chatterji et al. (2002) use linked data on mothers and children from the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They find that WIC participation is
associated with lower breastfeeding initiation rates but has no significant impact on
breastfeeding persistence (breastfeeding for at least 16 weeks). The authors instrument
for WIC participation using state-level Medicaid and WIC policies determined by each
State. However, a Hausman test fails to reject that WIC participation is exogenous.
The study of Chatterji et al. (2002) is one of the few studies that focus on the
effect of participation in the WIC program after the birth of a child. The other study on
this topic that we are aware of is Chatterji and Brooks-Gunn (2004), who use data from
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study for the years of 1999 through 2000. WIC
participation is measured by a binary variable indicating whether a woman participated in
WIC after childbirth. The variation in the duration of participation does not affect the
dummy variable, that is, women who participated in WIC during postpartum period are
considered participants regardless of how long they participated. The authors employ
Probit and OLS models to estimate the program effects on the likelihood of breastfeeding
initiation and breastfeeding duration (measured by the logarithm of the number of weeks
the woman breastfed). The authors find that WIC participants are more likely to initiate
breastfeeding, with the estimate significant at the 5% level. However no significant
association was found between WIC participation and breastfeeding duration.
While existing studies estimate the effects of WIC program on breastfeeding
activities based on OLS, Probit, or logistic models, Ma et al. (2014) is the only study to
our knowledge that employs duration analysis. The study uses data from the 2009 - 2010
South Carolina Pregnancy Assessment and Monitoring System to estimate the association
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between prenatal WIC participation and breastfeeding initiation as well as the hazard of
weaning (discontinuing breastfeeding). The sample was divided into WIC participants,
income-eligible nonparticipants, and income-ineligible nonparticipants based on the
185% of the Federal Poverty Level threshold of the eligibility for WIC participation.
Using logistic regression models, they find WIC participants are less likely to initiate
breastfeeding than both income-eligible and income-ineligible nonparticipants. However,
once initiated, based on Cox proportional hazards models and the Kaplan-Meier method,
no significant association was found between WIC participation and the hazard of
weaning, indicating that the prenatal WIC participation status does not significantly
impact the breastfeeding duration. Since the sample used in this study is limited to South
Carolina, one should be cautious to generalize their conclusions.
2.2.3
2.2.3.1

Literature on peer effects
Previous studies on peer effects in the social science field
It is well-known and widely recognized in social sciences that one person’s

behavior often influences the behavior of neighbors, classmates, colleagues, peers, etc.
This phenomenon, known as peer effects, or spillovers, has been widely studied in
various areas of social science. Christakis and Fowler (2007), Cohen-Cole and Fletcher
(2008), Trogdon et al. (2008) and Valente et al. (2009), to name just a few, investigate
the role of peer influences in the spread of obesity. There is also ample evidence that peer
effects are important in forming youth’s attitudes toward risky behavior, including
cigarette smoking (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Powell et al. 2005), alcohol drinking
(Clark and Loheac, 2007; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001), drug use (Gaviria and Raphael,
2001), and dropping out of school (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001). The impact of social
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interactions can also be seen in the influence of roommates on academic performance,
including GPA and SAT scores (Betts and Morell, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; Zimmerman,
2003), academic cheating (Carrell et al., 2008), or the choice of college major (DeGiorgi
et al., 2010).
The literature on breastfeeding has mostly focused on the individual factors that
affect breastfeeding decisions, such as marital and work status, age, education level,
race/ethnicity, while peer influences received substantially less attention in the literature
and studies on this topic have been relatively sparse. The studies investigate the role of
peer counseling and promotional videos provided by WIC (see for instance Gross et al.,
1998) or information and social support that comes from social contacts, such as health
professionals, friends or family members (Matich and Sims, 1992; Giugliani et al., 1994;
Humphreys et al., 1998). 9 Peer counselor support and promotional videos provided by
WIC are found to have a positive effect on breastfeeding persistence (Gross et al., 1998).
While the literature is not conclusive about the effectiveness of breastfeeding promotion
by health professionals, it is generally believed that among other social contacts, the
infant’s father has the highest impact on woman’s breastfeeding decisions (Matich and
Sims, 1992; Giugliani et al., 1994). Although it is very important to study the effects of
peer counseling programs and social support, we also need to understand the role of
spontaneous peer influences, where a woman’s decision to breastfeed is affected by the

9Any

woman who has had a successful breastfeeding experience could volunteer to become a breastfeeding peer

counselor. Peer counselors help new mothers to establish successful breastfeeding by sharing their own knowledge and
experience, providing emotional and practical support.
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breastfeeding decisions of her peers. It is precisely this effect that gives rise to a social
multiplier. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to address this question.
2.2.3.2

Definition of Peer Effects
Estimating peer effects is methodologically challenging, as one needs to separate

causality from other effects that lead to spurious correlation between the behavior of an
individual and the behavior of her peers. According to Manski (1993), one might observe
the correlation because of the following three effects:
1. Endogenous effects where the individual’s behavior is influenced by the
behavior of others in the group;
2. Exogenous, or contextual, effects where the individual’s behavior is
influenced by the exogenous characteristics of the group;
3.

Correlated effects where the individuals in the same group tend to behave
similarly because they have similar characteristics or face similar
institutional environment.

These three effects explain why the people in the same group tend to behave
similarly. Applicable to our case, endogenous effects are the “true” peer effects that we
are trying to estimate. They measure how peers’ breastfeeding decisions directly affect a
woman’s decisions and therefore reflect the pure causality relationship. Exogenous
(contextual) effects arise when a woman’s breastfeeding decision is influenced by the
exogenous characteristics of her peer group, for instance, age, the level of education, etc,
and older and more educated women are more likely to breastfeed. Correlated effects
arise when breastfeeding is influenced by the means of variables, which
are unobservable to econometrician but affect the breastfeeding activities. For example,
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the women who have same attitude towards home production tend to form a group, and
this attitude can affect the breastfeeding activities.
Two comments need to be made about the peer effects. First, numerous studies
suggest that peer effects play an important role in the spread of obesity, forming youth’s
attitudes toward risky behavior, and the academic performance, however one should keep
in mind that failure to account for exogenous effects may produce spurious estimates of
peer effects (Cohen-Cole and Fletcher, 2008). Second, the three effects have different
policy implications. The interdependence between individual and peer decisions, or the
endogenous effects, gives rise to a social multiplier (Manski, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2002).
The social multiplier amplifies the effects of public policy measures, as any exogenous
changes in the individual behavior will influence the peers’ behavior, and then in turn the
behavior of peers would influence the individual. For example, consider a policy that
promotes breastfeeding activity of a specific group of women. If the policy is effective
and does promote the breastfeeding activity of the group of women, the breastfeeding
decisions of the women in this group will affect the others through peer effects, therefore,
the policy indirectly promotes breastfeeding activity of other women as well. Exogenous
effects and correlated effects do not generate the ‘social multiplier’, which is another
reason to isolate the endogenous effects from the exogenous effects and correlated
effects.
In this study, Information about peer effects is taken from Question 38 on the
prenatal questionnaire. The question reads "About how many of your friends and
relatives have breastfed their babies?" The answer was designed as a categorical variable.
We introduce three dummy variables; each corresponds to a positive answer to one the
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following questions: "One or two", "Three to five", and "More than five". The women
who have not known a peer who breastfed are treated as the benchmark group. To control
for exogenous effects, we use a rich set of covariates, which include various demographic
and residential characteristics, age, education level, prenatal smoking, family income, etc.
According to Manski (1993), we would use lagged reference group information (i.e.,
characteristics of each woman's peer group) to separate the endogenous and exogenous
effects. However, prior information specifying the composition of reference groups is not
available to us. The above-mentioned covariates factors would also help us to address
the self-selection problem that could give rise to correlated effects. It is reasonable to
expect that women choose their friends on the basis of the aforementioned characteristics.
Therefore, similar to Valente et al. (2009), we assume peer selection does not depend on
unobservable characteristics that affect breastfeeding. This assumption is not completely
innocuous, as there might still be variables that are correlated with both the selection into
peer groups and breastfeeding decisions. However, the validity of this assumption is
reinforced by the fact that, most likely, woman’s and her peers’ breastfeeding decisions
are not made concurrently. Women report their peers’ breastfeeding decisions on their
prenatal questionnaire, which is taken before woman could initiate breastfeeding. But no
formal test is performed to examine the validity of the assumptions due to the
unavailability of the data.
2.3
2.3.1

Data and estimation methods and results
Data
We use data from the Infant Feeding Practices Study II (IFPS II) conducted by the

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An important advantage of our data is that
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the surveys are conducted concurrent with the behavior, in contrast to most surveys,
which are retrospective. IFPS II is a longitudinal consumer-based study and data were
collected from May 2005 till June 2007 using a series of questionnaires. One
questionnaire was sent before the baby was born, one questionnaire was sent about three
weeks after the baby’s birth, and another ten questionnaires were mailed approximately
monthly throughout the baby’s first year of life. The dataset excludes the mothers that
were younger than 18 years old at the time of the prenatal questionnaire; the infants are
required to be full or nearly full-term and a singleton, and weigh at least 5 pounds at
birth. The study also excludes the mothers who had a medical problem that was likely to
affect the feeding decision and the infants who had at birth or developed an illness or
condition that was likely to affect feeding decisions during the first year of life. In
addition, respondents were excluded if they lived in a zip code to which the US postal
service stopped delivering mail as a result of the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Detailed
information on both mothers and infants can be obtained from the study, including the
mothers’ demographic and residential characteristics, the infants’ health condition, the
foods fed to infants, the WIC participation status, as well as the information about
breastfeeding, such as initiation and duration of breastfeeding. Another advantage of the
data is that it provides information on the breastfeeding decisions of the respondents’
friends in the prenatal survey, which allows us to examine peer effects in breastfeeding.
The sample size consists of 4,902 pregnant women for the prenatal questionnaire,
and the response rates after the prenatal questionnaire varies from 63% to 83%. 10 A

10

The response rates are defined as the percentage of complete and qualified questionnaires for each survey.

57

limitation of the study is that it is not representative of the US population since the
sampling frame was a consumer opinion panel. To make the comparison, statistics of
IFPS II sample and CDC National Immunization Survey (NIS) over years of 2005
through 2007 are shown in Table 2.3. 11 The National Immunization Survey was mainly
used to monitor childhood immunization coverage, but since July 2001, breastfeeding
questions have been asked to assess the population's breastfeeding practices. 81.26% of
women in our sample are white, compared to the NIS of 80.73% - 81.03% over years of
2005 through 2007; 75.22% of the women in our sample are married, which is very close
to the NIS of during the time period (74.83% - 75.92%). However, the maternal age of
60.53% women in our sample is below 30, while it varies from 34.93% – 36.71% in NIS
over years of 2005 through 2007. Besides, the percentage of women who attend at least
some college in our sample is slightly higher than that in NIS (75.32% of women have
some college education or higher in IFPS II, while in NIS it is around 70%). For
breastfeeding activities, the women in our sample are more likely to initiate
breastfeeding, to breastfeed through 6 months and 12 months and to exclusively
breastfeed through 3 months, but they are less likely to breastfeed exclusively through 6
months than the women in NIS.
Another limitation of this study is that all data are self reported by the
respondents, which creates two problems. First, there are missing values because the
respondents are likely to skip one or more questions in a survey or even a whole survey;
second, the accuracy of the data reported by the respondents are not verified by any other

11

The national demographical characteristics are calculated based on the national sample that are used to form the any

breastfeeding rates table by socio-demographic factors.
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documents. For all the models estimated in this chapter, we exclude the observations
with missing values for any of the variables included in the models. Table 2.4 compares
the breastfeeding activities for the overall sample with the observations without missing
values on variables listed in the table. The sample size is reduced to 1791 after deleting
missing values for all the variables. The table shows that discrepancies exist in the partial
and exclusive breastfeeding durations, but the probabilities of breastfeeding at month 3
and month 6 are not statistically different. We assume that data are missing at random,
and the estimates remain consistent after we delete the observations with missing
values. The argument is that IFPS II data is a general survey of mothers and infants. The
questionnaires contain questions about infant feeding practices, infant sleeping
arrangements, child care arrangements, the health status of mothers and infants, etc.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the missing values process is conditional upon
observable variables, thus the discrepancies can be explained by the variables included in
the model, such as race, marital status, education level, etc. We further assume the data
reported by the respondents are accurate because the surveys have been conducted
concurrent with the behavior and all information was fresh for the respondent to fill in.
These assumptions, however, are not verified by any test.
2.3.2
2.3.2.1

Estimation methods and results for the effects of WIC program
Data used for WIC effects models
To check the effects of WIC participation on breastfeeding activities, we divide

the sample into three groups. WIC participants are identified as the respondents who
participated in the WIC program prenatally (the respondents who checked ‘yes, I was
enrolled or got WIC food for myself’ in the prenatal questionnaire). Since it is required
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for the applicants’ gross income to be at or below 185 percent of the Federal Poverty
income, we use 185 percent of the Federal Poverty income as a threshold to determine the
income eligibility of the respondents. Therefore, income-eligible non-participants are
defined as the respondents who did not participate in the WIC program prenatally but
whose incomes were no more than 185 percent of the Federal poverty income guidelines.
Income-ineligible non-participants are the respondents who did not participate in the
WIC program prenatally and whose incomes were more than 185 percent of the Federal
poverty income guidelines. Following Schwartz et al. (1995), we exclude the incomeineligible nonparticipants, who cannot make a choice about participating in WIC
program, from the study, and by doing so we end up with 2,616 observations. This
sample contains participants whose income is above 185 percent of the Federal poverty
income guideline.12
Table 2.5 compares the breastfeeding activities of WIC participants with those of
eligible nonparticipants. The tests show that WIC participants have significantly shorter
breastfeeding durations than the eligible nonparticipants. On average, the eligible
nonparticipants breastfeed their babies for 22.65 weeks, while the WIC participants
breastfeed for 15.28 weeks. The exclusive breastfeeding durations for WIC
nonparticipants and participants are 5.73 and 3.31 weeks, respectively. The percentages
of women who initiate breastfeeding and breastfeed through 3 months and 6 months,
either partially or exclusively, are also lower for WIC participants. This phenomenon is
confirmed by Figure 2.3, which shows the survival functions of WIC participants and

12

375 participants fall into this category.
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nonparticipants estimated by Kaplan Meier method. The survival function for both partial
and exclusive breastfeeding of WIC participants falls below that of the nonparticipants,
which means the WIC participants are less likely to survive (continue breastfeeding) than
the nonparticipants at a given time period.
The comparison of other variables used in this chapter is also shown in Table 2.5.
The differences in many other variables, including the percentage of women who know
more than five peers who breastfed, prenatal smoking and demographic variables, are
significant between the two groups. All the variables are defined in Table 2.6. The
breastfeeding duration is measured as the amount of time (in weeks) from child's birth
until the woman stops breastfeeding. Both partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations
are provided in the data. For women who were still breastfeeding at the time of the last
survey, we first calculate breastfeeding duration as the days from child’s birth until the
complete date of the last survey; we then transform it to the value in weeks.
The descriptive statistics for the sample without income ineligible nonparticipants
is presented in Table 2.7. After excluding the observations with missing values for key
variables, 639 observations remain. In this partial sample, over 90% of the women
initiated breastfeeding, and the average partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations are
about 21.43 and 4.67 weeks, respectively. More than half of the women are enrolled in
the WIC program during pregnancy. The percentages for the women who have 1-2 peers
or 3-5 peers are both around 25%, and about one third of the women report that they have
more than 5 peers who breastfed their babies.
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2.3.2.2

Estimation methods and results for WIC effects models
To measure the effects of WIC participation on breastfeeding behavior, we

subdivide our models into three categories: (1) breastfeeding initiation; (2) the duration of
partial breastfeeding; and (3) the duration of exclusive breastfeeding. For each model, we
first estimate a model that controls for common demographic characteristics only; in the
second model WIC participation status is included; the third model adds peer effects,
which are unique to our data; and the fourth model includes both WIC and peer effects. 13
2.3.2.2.1

Estimation methods and results for breastfeeding initiation models

In the breastfeeding initiation models, a woman is classified as initiating
breastfeeding if she claimed ‘baby was ever breastfed’ and breastfeed for at least one
week (Chatterji et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2009). We estimate the following Probit regression:
Y1  (1   2WIC   3' Peer   4' Z  u1 )

(2.1)

Where Y1 measures if the woman initiated breastfeeding (breastfed for at least one
week in this study); WIC is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the woman is
enrolled in the program prenatally and 0 otherwise; Peer represents a vector of three peer
effects dummy variables, and Z is a matrix of exogenous variables, which include age,
marital status, race, region of residence, level of education, prenatal smoking,
contribution of mother’s pay to family income prenatally, comfort in nursing around
close women friends, whether mother had been breastfed as infant, and household
income.

13

All analyses are conducted using SAS 9.4(SAS Institute, Inc, Cary, NC).
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Marginal effects of each variable are reported in Table 2.8. In column 1 we
present the estimates for the benchmark model without WIC or peer effects. Married
women are 4% more likely to initiate breastfeeding than the unmarried women, and
attending at least some college increase the probability of breastfeeding their babies by
5%. The women who were breastfed are 4% more likely to breastfeed their babies. The
women who provide most of family income are 3.9% less likely to initiate breastfeeding.
Overall, these results are consistent with expectations and the findings of existing
literature (Roe et. al., 1999, Chatterji et al., 2002, Mandal et. al., 2010; Ma et. al., 2014).
In columns 2-4 of Table 2.8, the estimation results for breastfeeding initiation
models with WIC effects only, with peer effects only, and with both WIC and peer
effects are presented. WIC participation status has negative coefficients in both models
with WIC effects, but neither of them is significant. Peer effects do not significantly
affect breastfeeding initiation either, regardless of the number of the peers who breastfed
their babies. The log-likelihood tests indicate that neither WIC participation nor peer
effects help explain the variation of breastfeeding initiation. The other variables have
almost identical coefficients as in the baseline model presented in column 1.
Married women tend to breastfeed at higher rates because it is easier for them to
take extended unpaid maternity leave since husbands can still work to support the family.
This is confirmed by the negative coefficient on the high contribution of mother’s pay to
the household income. The women who provide majority of family income initiate
breastfeeding at significantly lower rates due to the lack of financial support. Women
with college education are more likely to breastfeed because they are more likely to work
at jobs that would qualify for mandated maternity leave so that they can take more time
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off work without the risk of losing their jobs. In addition, educated women are more
likely to have workplaces that are supportive of breastfeeding, which facilitates
breastfeeding even they go back to work (i.e., they have an independent office so it is
convenient for them to express milk during work). The most at risk group are uneducated,
unmarried women who provide majority of family income (i.e., single mothers). They are
constrained in terms of infant feeding options because it is likely that they have to go
back to work quickly.
The estimation results shown in Table 2.8 indicate that enrolling in WIC program
does not significantly affect the breastfeeding initiation. Since the models are not
designed to separate the substitution effect from the provision of free formula and the
income effect from breastfeeding promotion provided by the program, the insignificance
of WIC participation has two explanations. It can be because either both substitution and
income effects are not significant or the two effects are both significant but the net effect
becomes negligible. Despite the insignificant effect of WIC participation on
breastfeeding, we do not question the existence of the program. Many studies show that
WIC program has significant positive effects on the overall health of children (Carlson
and Senauer, 2003) and is associated with reductions in low birth weight (Devaney, 1992;
Bitler and Currie, 2005; Figlio et al, 2009; Hoynes et. al, 2011; Currie &Rajani, 2014).
Our results suggest that the program is facing some challenges while trying to balance the
provision of nutritious food and infant formula and encouraging the participants to
breastfeed.
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2.3.2.2.2
2.3.2.2.2.1

Estimation methods and results for breastfeeding duration models
Estimation methods for breastfeeding duration models

Next, we conduct survival analysis for the partial and exclusive breastfeeding
duration models to examine the effects of WIC program on breastfeeding duration.
Survival analysis, also known as duration analysis, is suitable when the outcome variable
is the time until the occurrence of an event of interest. In survival analysis, subjects are
usually followed over a specified time period and the focus is on the time at which the
event of interest occurs. The dependent variable in survival analysis is composed of two
parts: one is the time to event and the other is the event status, which records if the event
of interest occurred or not. In this study, we treat stopping exclusive and partial
breastfeeding as two separate events for each woman. Woman either survives (continues
breastfeeding) or does not survive (stops breastfeeding) at each moment of time. Some
women are still (exclusively) breastfeeding at the time of the last survey, such
observations are right-hand censored. The event variable would have value of zero for
censored observations and one for uncensored observations. The time to event variable is
the duration variable. Women whose breastfeeding duration is zero are excluded from our
sample.
Survival models can be divided into discrete-time models and continuous-time
models, depending on whether the transition event of interest occurs at any particular
instant in time or not. The analysis can be conducted using nonparametric,
semiparametric, or parametric procedures. Kaplan-Meier is a widely used nonparametric
method to estimate and graph survival functions. Unlike the nonparametric estimation,
parametric models assume different parametric forms for the hazard function. Popular
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parametric assumptions are Exponential, Weibull, Log-logistic, and Lognormal.
Cox’s(1972) proportional hazard model is a semiparametric model, which makes fewer
assumptions than typical parametric methods but more assumptions than nonparametric
methods. The Cox proportional hazard model is given by
h(t i )  h0 (t i ) exp( 1 X i1   2 X i 2  ...   p X ip )

(2.2)

where h0 (t ) is the baseline hazard function. For the Cox proportional hazard model, no
assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard function needs to be made, so h0 (t ) can
be any function of t as long as it is nonnegative.
For the categorical variables in the Cox proportional hazard model, the hazard
ratio is easier to interpret than the coefficient. For variable X j , the hazard ratio is


calculated as e j and is independent of the baseline hazard function. Holding other
variables constant, hazard ratios greater than1 or positive coefficients indicate an
increased risk (hazard) of stopping breastfeeding (shorter breastfeeding duration), while
hazard ratios less than 1 or negative coefficients indicate a decreased risk (hazard) of
stopping breastfeeding (longer breastfeeding duration). More specifically, hazard ratios
are interpreted as the percentage change in risk. Hazard ratio is equal to 2 (0.5) indicates
that compared with the reference group (the group where X j  0 ), it is twice likely (50%
less likely) that the treatment group (the group where X j  1 ) stops breastfeeding at a
specific time. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of breastfeeding duration,
both partial and exclusive; the survival time is a continuous random variable since it is
measured in days, although it is converted to weeks. We estimate a survival model of the
form
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h(t i )  h0 (t i ) exp( W WIC   P' Peer   Z' Z  u 2 )

(2.3)

using some common parametric specification for h0 as well as the semiparametric Cox
model wherein we do not need to specify a distribution for h0 . The explanatory variables
are defined as in the Probit model, equation (2.1). The dependent variable is the duration
of either partial or exclusive breastfeeding. An infant is classified as partial breastfed if
any amount of breast milk is consumed; he or she is considered exclusively breastfed if
no other food or drink (aside from vitamins, minerals, and medicines) is consumed except
breast milk.
Hazard ratios are reported. To better interpret the model results, we also calculate
the median duration. For the significant variables that we are interested in, we calculate
their effects on median duration. Exponential, Weibull, Loglogistic, and Lognormal
duration hazard models are estimated to calculate the median breastfeeding duration and
the marginal effects (only median duration and marginal effects are reported). Since the
Cox proportional hazard model does not make assumption about the baseline hazard,
which is necessary to calculate the expected duration, we make assumption on the
baseline hazard to do the calculation. Different scenarios are reported by changing the
assumption on the baseline hazard to examine the effect of the assumption on the
marginal effects of key variables.
2.3.2.2.2.2

Tests for assumption of breastfeeding duration models

As discussed in previous section, Cox proportional hazard model does not make
assumption about the baseline hazard. However, it does assume that the hazard function
for two different individuals has the same shape, differing only by a constant
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multiplicative scaling factor that does not vary with survival time. Three tests have been
conducted to test the validity of proportional hazard assumption in this study. One
graphical test is to create Kaplan-Meier Curves which show the survival functions for
two groups. The parallelism between the survival functions for two different individuals
is an indication of the validity of the assumption. Another graphical test is based on
Schoenfeld residuals (Schoenfeld, 1982), which are computed with one per observation
per covariate. If the proportional hazards assumption holds, the Schoenfeld residuals
show no association with time. Lastly, the Supremum Test is performed to test the
assumption. The test creates a p-value for each variable, and a small p-value indicates a
violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
For both partial and exclusive breastfeeding models, the survival functions
estimated by Kaplan-Meier method show that the WIC nonparticipants are more likely to
survive than the WIC participants. The graphs are shown in Figure 2.3. The hazard
functions for these two groups have the same shape and never across during the whole
time period. Figure 2.4 exhibits the Schoenfeld residuals for both models. Both curves are
close to 0 and the 95% confidence intervals include the 0 line. Both graphical tests
suggest the proportional hazard assumption holds.
The validity of the assumption is confirmed by the formal tests shown in Table
2.9. The p-value for age is 0.004 in the partial breastfeeding model. However, in both
models, all other variables have a p-value that is greater than 0.05, including the variables
that are of most interest in this study. Combining the information provided by the
survival function and Schoenfeld residuals graphs, we conclude the proportional hazards
assumption holds in both partial and exclusive breastfeeding models.
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2.3.2.2.2.3

Estimation results for breastfeeding duration models

In Table 2.10, we present the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard
model for partial breastfeeding duration. The model without controlling for either WIC
effects or peer effects is shown in column1. The hazard ratio of age is 0.947, which
indicates that women are 5.3% less likely ((0.947-1)*100%) to stop breastfeeding than
the women who are one year younger and have similar characteristics. The probability of
stopping breastfeeding for the married women is 26.1% lower than the unmarried
women. Higher educational attainment, whether or not the woman was breastfed as an
infant, and higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding are all associated with lower
instantaneous rate (hazard) of quitting breastfeeding. Prenatal smoking and the family
income, on the other hand, positively affects the hazard (depresses the breastfeeding
activity). Comparing with the nonsmoking women, the hazard rate of stopping
breastfeeding are 53% higher for the women who smoke prenatally.
When we control for WIC effects and/or peer effects, the signs, magnitudes, and
significance of above-mentioned variables are similar. When we add WIC effects in
column 2, the estimation results and log likelihood test both indicate that WIC effects
alone do not significantly affect partial breastfeeding duration. Peer effects are included
in column 3.The log likelihood test reveals that the peer effects are jointly significant. We
find that peer effects are not significant when the number of peers who breastfed is no
more than five, but having more than five peers who breastfed positively affect partial
breastfeeding. This result indicates that mothers may require a very strong support group
in order to continue breastfeeding. Comparing with women who have not known a peer
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who breastfed, women who have more than five peers who breastfed are about 44% less
likely to stop breastfeeding, with or without WIC effects included in the model.
Next, we calculate the median duration increases for the three peer effects dummy
variables. The results are presented in Table 2.11. We first calculate the duration
assuming all the independent variables are at the median values (median duration) for the
4 parametric models, including Exponential, Weibull, Loglogistic, and Lognormal
duration models. The median durations based on the 4 parametric models are around 20
weeks. We then calculate the median duration difference by changing the values of the
peer effects variables. The results show that comparing with the women who have not
known a peer who breastfed, having peers who breastfed increases the median duration.
More specifically, women who have more than five peers who breastfed increase their
breastfeeding duration by more than 17 weeks based on the 4 parametric models with
peer effects only.
For the Cox proportional hazard model, the baseline hazard function differs by
individual and is not estimated. However, we can propose different baseline values to
examine how different women might respond to peer effects. In the model without WIC
participation variable, we assume baseline hazards of 0, 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 which
represent median breastfeeding durations of 11.64, 14.94, 19.18, and 24.63 weeks,
respectively, holding other factors constant at the median. A larger baseline indicates a
greater predisposition towards breastfeeding, which explains the increasing median
duration as baseline hazard increases. The results also show that the increase in duration
from having more than five peers who breastfed varies from 8.91 to 18.86 weeks as the
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baseline increases from 0 to 0.75. In the model with WIC participation variable, the
results are very similar.
The results shown in Table 2.10 indicate that more matured, married, and more
educated women are less likely to stop breastfeeding at a specific time. This is a
conclusion consistent with the finding from initiation models and the existing literature
(Roe et. al., 1999, Chatterji et al., 2002, Mandal et. al., 2010; Ma et. al., 2014). Women in
higher income family are less likely to breastfeed because they are more likely to be
working mothers and need to go back to work. The high contribution of women’s to the
family income does not significantly affect partial breastfeeding duration, although it
negatively affects breastfeeding initiation as Table 2.8 shown. Prenatal smoking and
perceived comfort in breastfeeding have opposite effects on partial breastfeeding
duration.
WIC participation does not have significant partial breastfeeding duration, just as
in initiation models. However, peer effects, which do not affect breastfeeding initiation
significantly, have significant positive effects on partial breastfeeding duration and
appear after a critical mass of the prevalence of breastfeeding in a peer group is achieved.
In addition, as the baseline hazard increases, the magnitude of the peer effects variables
on median duration increases, suggesting the higher the propensity to breastfeed, the
larger the effect of peers on partial breastfeeding duration. Whether or not the woman
was breastfed as an infant is significant in all models in Table 2.10, but it becomes less
significant when peer effects are included in the model. This is not surprising because the
peers are defined as both friends and relatives. Therefore, the effect from the woman’s
mother is mitigated when peer effects as a whole are included in the model.
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The estimation results for exclusive breastfeeding are presented in Table 2.12.
The model without controlling for either WIC effects or peer effects is shown in
column1. Women are 4.3% less likely to stop exclusive breastfeeding than the women
who are one year younger and have similar characteristics. Comparing with the partial
breastfeeding models, the effect of marital status is larger in magnitude in the exclusive
breastfeeding models. The probability of stopping exclusive breastfeeding for the married
women is 43.2% lower than the unmarried women. Higher educational attainment and
whether or not the woman was breastfed as an infant are associated with lower
instantaneous rate (hazard) of quitting breastfeeding, while the family income positively
affects the hazard (depresses the breastfeeding activity).
When we control for WIC effects and/or peer effects, the signs and magnitudes of
above-mentioned variables are similar, with slight change in significance levels for
education level, whether or not the woman was breastfed as an infant, and family income.
In contrast to the joint significance of peer effects in the partial breastfeeding models, the
likelihood ratio tests indicate that there is no evidence that the models with peer effects
fits significantly better in the exclusive breastfeeding models. However, results again
show that having more than five peers who breastfed positively affect exclusive
breastfeeding, although in smaller magnitudes. Comparing with the women who have not
know a peer who breastfed, the women who have more than five peers who breastfed are
more than 30% less likely to stop exclusive breastfeeding, with or without WIC effects
included in the model.
The median exclusive breastfeeding duration increases for the three peer effects
dummy variables are presented in Table 2.13. The median breastfeeding durations based
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on the 4 parametric models are around 7 weeks. Comparing with the women who have
not known a peer who breastfed, women who have more than five peers who breastfed
increase their breastfeeding duration by more than 2.45 weeks based on the 4 parametric
models with peer effects only. For the Cox proportional hazard model, the baseline
hazard function differs by individual and is not estimated. We propose different baseline
values to examine how different women might respond to peer effects. In the model
without WIC participation variable, we assume baseline hazards of 0, 0.30, 0.60, and 0.90
which represent median exclusive breastfeeding durations of 7.11, 9.60, 12.95, and 17.49
weeks, respectively, holding other factors constant at the median. The increase in median
duration from having more than five peers who breastfed increases from 3.41 to 9.38
weeks as the baseline increases from 0 to 0.90. In the model with WIC participation
variable, the results are very similar.
Comparing with the partial breastfeeding models, the estimation for the exclusive
breastfeeding duration is less precise. Knowing more than five peers who breastfed
positively still affects the exclusive breastfeeding duration, but at lower significance
levels and in smaller magnitudes. Higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding and
prenatal smoking do not significantly affect the exclusive breastfeeding duration,
although they are highly significant in the partial breastfeeding models. This might be
due to that the exclusive breastfeeding duration also depends on the milk supply, which is
not controlled in the model. Similar to partial breastfeeding models, the propensity to
breastfeed, which is reflected by the baseline hazard of model, affects the magnitude of
the peer effects on exclusive breastfeeding duration.
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Both initiation models and duration models show that the prenatal WIC
participation does not significantly affect either partial or exclusive breastfeeding
duration. Neither substitution effect nor income effect dominates. This is a result
consistent with many previous studies (Jiang et al. 2010; Marshall et al. 2013; Ma et al.,
2014). Although the peers’ breastfeeding decisions do not significantly affect a woman’s
initiation decision, the estimation results for duration models indicate that mothers may
require a very strong support group in order to continue breastfeeding. This conclusion is
confirmed by the fact that peer effects are not significant when the number of peers who
breastfed is no more than five, but having more than five peers who breastfed positively
affect both partial and exclusive breastfeeding. Also, the magnitude of the peer effects on
each individual is different and depends on the individual’s propensity to breastfeed. The
higher the individual’s propensity, the larger is the effect. The results suggest the
presence of a social multiplier in breastfeeding, which has important policy implications.
Any exogenous change in breastfeeding behavior due to policy interventions would result
in an even greater change due to the bidirectional influences within peer groups.
Breastfeeding decisions of a woman are influenced by breastfeeding behavior of their
peers. Such a phenomenon may be observed due to advice, discouragement/
encouragement, transfer of knowledge, or help with breastfeeding that comes from the
peers. Peer effects play a more important role for breastfeeding duration than initiation.
2.3.3

Estimation methods for the peer effects based on full sample
In this section, we exclude the WIC participation variable and examine the peer

effects based on the full sample. In Table 2.14 we present the descriptive statistics for
covariates and dependent variables. For the breastfeeding activities, more than 90% of the
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women in this sample initiate breastfeeding; at month 3, the percentages of women who
are partially and exclusively breastfeeding are 67.51% and 38.37%, respectively. More
than half of the women have breastfed through 6 months, but less than 4% of the women
have exclusively breastfed through 6 months. The average durations for any
breastfeeding and exclusive breastfeeding are 25.5and 5.75 weeks, respectively. For the
peer effects variables, the women who know 1-2 peers, 3-5 peers, and more than five
peers who breastfed are about 20%, 30%, and 39%, respectively.
We subdivide our models into three categories: (1) breastfeeding initiation; (2) the
likelihood of partial breastfeeding at months three and six and exclusive breastfeeding at
month 3; and (3) the duration of partial and exclusive breastfeeding. 14
2.3.3.1

Estimation methods and results for Probit models
We estimate first breastfeeding initiation and breastfeeding at 3- and 6-month

models using the Probit models:
Y3  (1   2WIC   3' Peer   4' Z  u 3 )

(2.4)

where Y3 is a binary random variable of interest representing either woman’s
breastfeeding decision, including if breastfeeding is initiated, if breastfeeding at month 3
and month 6, and if exclusively breastfeeding at month 3 and month 6. A woman is
classified as initiating breastfeeding if she breastfeed for at least one week. The other
three dependent variables are defined based on their answers to the corresponding
questions. The explanatory variables are defined as in equation (1.1).

14

All analyses are conducted using STATA (12.0, College Station, TX, USA).

75

Table 2.15 summarizes the regression results for the likelihood of breastfeeding
initiation using the Probit model. To make a comparison, the estimation results for
models with and without peer effects are reported. Likelihood ratio test indicates that peer
effects significantly affect the breastfeeding initiation, a finding contrary to the
conclusion based on restricted sample. Women who were breastfed as infants are about
3.3% more likely to initiate breastfeeding. Higher educational attainment also positively
affects the breastfeeding initiation. Women who provide majority of the family income
are 3% less likely to breastfeed their babies. Contrary to the results based on restricted
sample, higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding increases the probability of initiating
breastfeeding by almost 4%, while marital status is insignificant.
Table 2.16 presents the Probit results for the probabilities of partial and exclusive
breastfeeding through months 3 and 6. The exclusive breastfeeding model at month 6 is
less accurate than others due to the disturbance in the dependent variable. Many women
introduce solid food to the infants at month 6 so they are not exclusively breastfeeding.
Estimation results for the other three models are consistent across the models and tell a
qualitatively similar story about the determinants of breastfeeding persistence. Women
are 1.1% more likely to breastfeed at month 3 than the women who are one year younger
and have similar characteristics. Being married, having higher educational attainment,
and having higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding all increase the probability of
breastfeeding at month 3 by more than 10% (12.4%, 14.6%, and 12.4%,
respectively).Women who were breastfed as infants are 7.1% more likely to
breastfeeding at month 3. Prenatal smoking decreases the likelihood of breastfeeding at
month 3 by 18%. The aforementioned factors are highly significant in all three
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regressions, so similar conclusions apply for the likelihood of breastfeeding at month 6
and exclusive breastfeeding at month 3, although with slightly different magnitudes.
Additionally, there is some evidence that Caucasian women are more likely to breastfeed
exclusively at month 3, while southern residence and higher contribution of mother’s pay
to family income are associated with lower likelihood of exclusive breastfeeding at
month 3. Women in higher income families tend to be 2.1% less likely to breastfeed at
month 6. This finding can be attributed to the fact that women in such families are more
likely to work, and tend to have lower breastfeeding persistence. This argument is
verified by the positive effect of marital status and education level. Married women with
high educational attainment are more likely to have financial support and job security,
which make them more capable to take advantage of unpaid leave and, therefore, have
higher likelihood of breastfeeding at month 3 and month 6. Overall, these results are
consistent with the previous literature on breastfeeding (Roe et. al., 1999, Chatterji et al.,
2002, and Mandal et. al., 2010).
The results presented in Table 2.16 indicate that peer effects appear only after a
critical mass of the prevalence of breastfeeding in a peer group is achieved. Knowing
only up to 5 friends of relatives who ever breastfed their babies does not have a
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of partial or exclusive breastfeeding at
three months (though having just one or two peers who breastfed has a positive effect on
the likelihood of breastfeeding at six months, which is only significant at 10% level).
However, having more than five peers who breastfed has highly significant positive
effects on the probabilities in all three regressions, although the magnitudes vary from
15.5% to 19.8%.
77

2.3.3.2

Estimation methods and results for duration models
To estimate peer effects in breastfeeding duration, the following equation is

estimated:
Y4   1   2WIC   3' Peer  '4 Z  u 4

(2.5)

where Y4 is a continuous variable of interest representing durations for either partial or
exclusive breastfeeding. The explanatory variables are defined as in equation (2.1).
To estimate breastfeeding duration models, we perform the baseline estimation by
ordinary least squares (OLS). However, in light of the fact that the data on partial
breastfeeding duration exhibits clustering at zero (i.e., a non-negligible fraction of
observations takes zero value) we also employ alternative techniques. To account for
right censoring which arises since we only observe each woman within twelve months
postpartum and some are still breastfeeding at their last survey, we estimate a two-limit
Tobit model with the upper limit of 52 weeks. 15 As for exclusive breastfeeding, we do
not have any right-censored observations because the recommended duration of exclusive
breastfeeding is significantly shorter than that of partial breastfeeding; most mothers
introduce solid foods, water, and juice prior or at six months postpartum. Therefore, we
estimate a type I Tobit model with left censoring at zero.
To overcome dependence on the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity,
which are essential for the consistency of Tobit estimates, and allow separate
mechanisms to determine the participation decision (i.e., whether to initiate
breastfeeding) and the amount decision (i.e., duration conditional on breastfeeding being

15

Out of 1271 observations, 253 are right-censored.
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initiated), we estimate two-tier (truncated normal hurdle) models of partial and exclusive
breastfeeding duration. The estimates remain consistent even when the strict
distributional assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity are relaxed.
Table 2.17 summarizes the estimation results for the partial breastfeeding
duration. OLS estimation suggests that the breastfeeding duration for women who are one
year older is 0.70 week longer. Being married and having higher educational attainment
increase partial breastfeeding duration by 5.27 and 6.94 weeks, respectively. The
breastfeeding duration for women who were breastfed as infants is 3.74 weeks longer.
Higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding increases the duration by 5.92 weeks. Prenatal
smoking and higher family income negatively affect the breastfeeding duration. We
estimate two-limit Tobit model to account for upper and lower censoring at 0 and 52
weeks, respectively. The conditional and unconditional marginal effects of Tobit model
reported in the table indicate similar results apply, although the magnitudes are slightly
different. To allow separate mechanisms to determine the participation decision
(initiation of partial or exclusive breastfeeding) and the amount decision (duration
conditional on breastfeeding being initiated), we also estimate truncated normal hurdle
models. The estimates for the amount decision are comparable to OLS and Tobit
estimates, and are also reported in Table 2.17.
The character of peer effects for breastfeeding duration resembles that for the
likelihood of breastfeeding. Again, peer influences are only significant after the
prevalence of breastfeeding in a peer group reaches some critical level. Knowing up to 5
friends or relatives who breastfed generally does not have a significant effect on
breastfeeding duration, while having more than five peers who breastfed has a highly
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significant positive effect in all three models. It increases the partial breastfeeding
duration by about 9 weeks, which is inconsequential.
The estimation results for exclusive breastfeeding duration are presented in Table
2.18 and are similar to the results for partial breastfeeding duration. However, age and if
the woman were breastfed become insignificant in both Tobit and truncated normal
hurdle model. Family income does not affect exclusive breastfeeding duration, although
it negatively affects partial duration. White women are exclusively breastfeeding more
than 2 weeks longer in both OLS model and Tobit model. Again, peer influences are only
significant after the prevalence of breastfeeding in a peer group reaches some critical
level. Knowing up to 5 friends or relatives who breastfed generally does not seem to have
a significant effect on exclusive breastfeeding duration, while having more than five
peers who breastfed has a highly significant positive effect in all three models. It
increases the exclusive breastfeeding duration by about 3 weeks.
We report estimates for the participation decision (which can be interpreted as the
likelihood of initiating partial or exclusive breastfeeding) in Table 2.19. As expected, the
estimates generally conform to the Probit estimates reported in Table 2.15.
Overall, findings based on restricted sample and full sample are consistent. Peers’
breastfeeding behavior positively affects a woman’s breastfeeding decisions. The results
suggest the presence of a social multiplier in breastfeeding, which has important policy
implications. Any exogenous change in breastfeeding behavior due to policy
interventions would result in an even greater change due to the bidirectional influences
within peer groups.
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2.4

Conclusions
In this chapter, we first estimate the effects of WIC participation on breastfeeding

behavior based on the sample without income ineligible participants. We use duration
analysis techniques to estimate the effects of the program participation on the
instantaneous rate (hazard) of stopping partial and exclusive breastfeeding using a
nationwide data set.
Higher perceived comfort in breastfeeding and prenatal smoking significantly
affects the instantaneous rate of stopping partial breastfeeding but not exclusive
breastfeeding. Age, family income level, marital status, higher educational attainment as
well as whether the woman was breastfed as an infant significantly affect both partial and
exclusive breastfeeding duration, suggesting both personal preference and economic and
employment-related factors affect infant feeding choices. Women who are unmarried,
without college education, and provide majority of the family income are constrained in
terms of the choice.
Both initiation models and duration models show that the prenatal WIC
participation does not significantly affect either partial or exclusive breastfeeding
duration, suggesting neither substitution effect from provision of free formula nor income
effect from breastfeeding promotion dominates. This is a result consistent with many
previous studies (Jiang et al. 2010; Marshall et al. 2013; Ma et al., 2014). Peers’
breastfeeding decisions do not significantly affect a woman’s initiation decision, but the
estimation results from breastfeeding duration models indicate that mothers may require a
very strong support group in order to continue breastfeeding. The magnitude of the peer
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effects on each individual is different and depends on the individual’s propensity to
breastfeed. The higher the individual’s propensity, the larger is the effect.
Despite the insignificant effect of prenatal WIC participation status on
breastfeeding persistence, we do not question the necessity of the existence of the
program. Many studies find that the WIC program has significant positive impact on the
overall health of children (Carlson and Senauer, 2003) and leads to an increase in the
birth weight of infants (Figlio et al, 2009; Hoynes et. al, 2009; Hoynes et. al, 2011). Our
results do suggest that the program is facing some challenges while trying to balance the
provision of nutritious food and infant formula and encouraging the participants to
breastfeed. The results also suggest the presence of a social multiplier in breastfeeding,
which has important policy implications. Any exogenous change in breastfeeding
behavior due to policy interventions would result in an even greater change due to the
bidirectional influences within peer groups. Peer effects play a more important role for
breastfeeding duration than initiation.
Second, we study the role of peer influences on the initiation and duration of
breastfeeding (both partial and exclusive) and the likelihood of breastfeeding at three and
six months postpartum based on the full sample. The results on peer effects are generally
consistent with the findings from the restricted sample, except that they are also
significant in initiation model. For the peer effects to become significant, the prevalence
of breastfeeding in a peer group has to reach a certain minimum level, or “critical mass”.
Again, knowing less than five friends or relatives that ever breastfed generally does not
have a significant effect on breastfeeding decisions, but having more than five peers who
breastfed has a highly significant positive effect on the likelihood of breastfeeding and
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the both partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations. It increases the probability of
initiating by 3.7% and the likelihood of breastfeeding at months 3 and 6 by more than
15%. It also increases the partial and exclusive breastfeeding durations by 9 and 3 weeks,
respectively.
Our results should be interpreted with caution as our data is from a survey
conducted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that relies on volunteer
participants. The formal test that distinguishes endogenous and exogenous effect is not
performed due to the limitation of the data. When we estimate the effects of WIC
program, we do not account for women’s self-selection into the program.
Table 2.1

Maximum Monthly Allowances of Supplemental Foods for Women

Foods

Juice, single strength
Milk
Breakfast cereal
Cheese
Eggs
Fruits and vegetables

Postpartum
women (up to 6
months
postpartum)

96 fl oz
16 qt
36 oz
NA
1 dozen
$10.00 in cash
value vouchers
Whole wheat bread
NA
fish
NA
Legumes, dry or
1 lb (64 ounce
canned and/or peanut canned) Or 18
butter
oz
Data source: http://www.fns.usda.gov

Pregnant and
partially
breastfeeding
women (up to 1 year
postpartum)
144fl oz
22 qt
36 oz
NA
1 dozen
$10.00 in cash value
vouchers
1 lb
NA
1 lb (64 ounce
canned) And 18 oz
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Fully
breastfeeding
women (up to 1
year postpartum)
144fl oz
24 qt
36 oz
1 lb
2 dozen
$10.00 in cash
value vouchers
1 lb
30 oz
1 lb (64 ounce
canned) And 18
oz

Table 2.2

Maximum Monthly Allowances of Supplemental Foods for Infants

Breastfeeding
status

Baby’s age

WIC
formula*

Infant
cereal

0-3 months
823 floz
4-5 months
896 floz
6-11 months
630 floz
24 oz
0-1 month
104 floz
1-3 months
388 floz
Partially
breastfed
4-5 months
460 floz
6-11 month
315 floz
24 oz
Fully
0-5 months
breastfed
6-11 months
24 oz
Data source: http://www.fns.usda.gov
* Baby formula is reconstituted liquid concentrate
Fully formula
fed
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Infants food
fruits and
vegetables

Infant food
meat

128 oz

128 oz
256 oz

77.5 oz

Table 2.3

Comparison of IFPS II and National Immunization Survey (NIS)
Sample
N=4902*
85.26

NIS 2005
N=23714
74.10

NIS 2006
N=24866
74.00

NIS 2007
N=16629
75.60

Ever breastfed (%)
Any breastfeeding
49.81
42.90
43.50
43.80
at 6 months (%)
Any breastfeeding
25.25
21.50
22.70
22.70
at 12 months (%)
Exclusively through
35.99
32.10
33.60
33.50
3 months (%)
Exclusively through
4.35
12.30
14.10
13.80
6 months (%)
Married (%)
75.22
75.92
75.67
74.83
White (%)
81.26
81.03
80.80
80.73
Education (%)
Not a high school
4.79
11.86
10.81
10.87
graduate
High school graduate
19.89
18.33
19.07
18.38
Some college
41.07
27.43
26.89
25.80
College graduate
34.25
42.38
43.23
44.95
Maternal age (%)
<20
5.54
2.18
1.93
2.16
20-29
54.99
34.52
32.99
32.77
>30
39.47
63.29
65.07
65.07
Data source: http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/data/nis_data/
* The missing values are deleted for each variable; therefore, the numbers of observations
in IFPS II sample for each variable vary.
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Table 2.4

Comparison of IFPS II overall sample and the sample with complete data
Sample without
missing values
N=1791

Overall Sample
N=4902*

p-value for t test**

Breastfeeding
22.03
25.89
<0.0001
duration (weeks)
Exclusive
breastfeeding duration
5.07
5.67
0.0221
(weeks)
Initiate breastfeed (%)
85.26
84.76
0.6357
Any breastfeeding at
60.39
59.52
0.5683
month three (%)
Any breastfeeding at
49.81
47.52
0.1541
month six (%)
Exclusively
breastfeeding at
35.99
35.79
0.8923
month three (%)
* The missing values are deleted for each variable; therefore, the numbers of observations
in IFPS II sample for each variable vary from 2092 and 3033.
** The p-values reported are for Satterthwaite t-tests. The p-values for pooled variances
t-test are similar and not reported here.
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Table 2.5

Comparison of breastfeeding activities of WIC participants and eligible
nonparticipants

N
772

Mean
15.28

Eligible
nonparticipants
N
Mean
479
22.65

887

3.31

557

5.73

<0.0001

Initiation

912

0.77

579

0.85

<0.0001

Bf_M3

665

0.46

445

0.63

<0.0001

Bf_M6

555

0.36

399

0.54

<0.0001

Exbf_M3

665

0.24

445

0.42

<0.0001

P12

1627

0.28

971

0.25

0.1433

P35

1627

0.25

971

0.24

0.5632

Pmore

1627

0.25

971

0.35

<0.0001

Age

1633

25.69

975

27.53

<0.0001

Married

1329

0.56

866

0.70

<0.0001

College

1316

0.59

859

0.67

0.0001

White

1580

0.75

939

0.82

0.0001

South

1639

0.40

977

0.35

0.0134

West

1639

0.18

977

0.23

0.0032

Smoke

1620

0.20

971

0.15

0.0002

Mother_breastfed

1622

0.44

973

0.48

0.0595

Income

1639

1.40

977

1.19

<0.0001

Inc_gt50

941

0.53

592

0.51

0.4965

Comfort

1320

0.66

827

0.68

0.6509

Variable
Duration (weeks)
Ex_duration
(weeks)

WIC participants

p-value
for ttest *
<0.0001

*The p-values reported are for Satterthwaite t-tests. The p-values for pooled variances ttest are similar and not reported here.
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Table 2.6

Variable definitions

Variable
Duration
Ex_duration
WIC
Initiation
Bf_m3
Bf_m6
Exbf_m3
P12
P35
Pmore
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_breastfed
Smoke
Inc_gt50
Income
Comfort

Description
Length of time that woman breastfeeds her infant, in weeks
Length of time that woman exclusively breastfeeds her infant,
in weeks
Dummy variable = 1 if woman was enrolled in WIC in the
last month at neonatal survey (at infant age 1 month) ; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman breastfed baby for at least 1
week; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman was breastfeeding her baby at
month three survey; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman was breastfeeding her baby at
month six survey; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman was exclusively breastfeeding
her baby at month 3 survey; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman knows one or two friends or
relatives who ever breastfed their babies; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman knows three to five friends or
relatives who ever breastfed their babies; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman knows more than five friends
or relatives who ever breastfed their babies; 0 otherwise
Age of woman, in years
Dummy variable = 1 if woman is married; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman has some college education
(including college degree) or graduate education; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman reports her race as white; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if residence is in southern U.S.; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if residence is in western U.S.; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman had been breastfed as infant; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman reported smoking during
pregnancy on her prenatal questionnaire; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable = 1 if woman’s pay contributes at least half
of the family’s income; 0 otherwise
Household income, percent of poverty level (100%
corresponds to 1.00)
Dummy variable = 1 if woman is comfortable or very
comfortable nursing around close women friends; 0 otherwise
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Table 2.7

Descriptive Statistics for WIC effect models

Variable

N

Mean

st. dev.

Min

Max

Initiation

639

0.9358

0.2452

0.0000

1.0000

Duration

529

21.4351

20.4575

0.0000

63.5714

Ex_duration

616

4.6677

7.6636

0.0000

48.4300

WIC

639

0.5775

0.4943

0.0000

1.0000

P12

639

0.2441

0.4299

0.0000

1.0000

P35

639

0.2660

0.4422

0.0000

1.0000

Pmore

639

0.3286

0.4701

0.0000

1.0000

Age

639

26.7919

5.4582

18.0000

45.0000

Married

639

0.5822

0.4936

0.0000

1.0000

College

639

0.7293

0.4447

0.0000

1.0000

White

639

0.7981

0.4017

0.0000

1.0000

South

639

0.3380

0.4734

0.0000

1.0000

West

639

0.2160

0.4118

0.0000

1.0000

Mother_breastfed

639

0.5368

0.4990

0.0000

1.0000

Smoke

639

0.1158

0.3202

0.0000

1.0000

Inc_gt50

639

0.4851

0.5002

0.0000

1.0000

Comfort

639

0.6714

0.4701

0.0000

1.0000

Income

639

1.4046

0.8635

0.1500

8.8300
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Table 2.8

Estimates of the Probit model for breastfeeding initiation (marginal effects,
standard errors in parentheses)

Variable

WIC

Without
WIC or peer
effects
(1)

P12

With WIC
effects only
(2)
-0.016
(0.016)

College
White
South
West
Smoke
Mother _breastfed
Inc_gt50
Comfort
Income
Number of
observations
Log likelihood
LR test Statistics
p-value for LR test

-0.014
(0.016)
-0.016
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.025)
0.005
(0.024)
0.000
(0.001)
0.034*
(0.019)
0.050**
(0.023)
-0.019
(0.016)
0.015
(0.016)
0.024
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.023)
0.035*
(0.018)
-0.038**
(0.017)
0.029
(0.018)
0.004
(0.009)
639
-132.3836
1.84
0.7648

0.000
(0.001)
0.040**
(0.019)
0.050**
(0.024)
-0.019
(0.017)
0.016
(0.016)
0.025
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.024)
0.040**
(0.017)
-0.039**
(0.017)
0.028
(0.018)
0.003
(0.009)

0.000
(0.002)
0.037*
(0.019)
0.051**
(0.024)
-0.019
(0.016)
0.016
(0.016)
0.025
(0.017)
-0.007
(0.024)
0.039**
(0.017)
-0.038**
(0.017)
0.029
(0.018)
0.004
(0.009)

639
-133.3047

639
-132.8637
0.88
0.3477

639
-132.7944
1.02
0.7963

pmore

Married

With WIC and
peer effects
(4)

-0.017
(0.026)
0.004
(0.025)
0.004
(0.025)
0.000
(0.001)
0.037**
(0.019)
0.049**
(0.023)
-0.019
(0.016)
0.015
(0.016)
0.024
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.023)
0.036**
(0.018)
-0.038**
(0.017)
0.028
(0.018)
0.003
(0.009)

P35

Age

With peer
effects only
(3)
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Table 2.9
Variables
WIC

Formal test for proportional hazards assumption
Partial breastfeeding
Max Absolute Values p-value
0.933
0.303

Exclusive breastfeeding
Max Absolute Values
p-value
0.970
0.325

P12

1.592

0.115

1.031

0.613

P35

0.635

0.945

0.798

0.881

pmore

1.379

0.268

1.471

0.28

Age

1.797

0.004

0.894

0.599

Married

1.347

0.052

0.782

0.703

College

0.838

0.422

0.782

0.587

White

1.302

0.077

0.766

0.577

South

0.880

0.414

0.873

0.524

West

0.680

0.715

0.923

0.480

Smoke

1.095

0.150

1.113

0.207

Mother
_breastfed
Income

0.689

0.674

1.236

0.151

0.615

0.760

0.385

0.981

Inc_gt50

0.726

0.602

0.556

0.908

Comfort

0.867

0.360

0.785

0.549
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Table 2.10

Estimates of the proportional hazard model for partial breastfeeding
duration (hazard ratios, p-values in parentheses).

Variable

WIC

Without
WIC or
peer effects
(1)

P12

With WIC
effects only
(2)
1.009
(0.932)

P35
pmore
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Smoke
Mother _breastfed
Inc_gt50
Comfort
Income

0.947***
(0.000)
0.739***
(0.005)
0.695***
(0.001)
0.906
(0.446)
1.137
(0.258)
0.939
(0.637)
1.530***
(0.005)
0.753***
(0.006)
1.115
(0.292)
0.705***
(0.001)
1.114**
(0.053)
499

0.947***
(0.000)
0.739***
(0.005)
0.695***
(0.001)
0.907
(0.452)
1.138
(0.257)
0.939
(0.639)
1.529***
(0.005)
0.753***
(0.006)
1.114
(0.294)
0.705***
(0.001)
1.114**
(0.053)
499

With peer
effects only
(3)

0.784
(0.124)
0.806
(0.167)
0.566***
(0.000)
0.949***
(0.000)
0.774**
(0.020)
0.690***
(0.001)
0.906
(0.446)
1.118
(0.331)
0.963
(0.782)
1.465**
(0.012)
0.830*
(0.079)
1.101
(0.349)
0.707***
(0.001)
1.123**
(0.036)
499

With WIC
and peer
effects
(4)
0.976
(0.818)
0.784
(0.124)
0.803
(0.163)
0.564***
(0.000)
0.949***
(0.000)
0.774**
(0.020)
0.692***
(0.001)
0.903
(0.437)
1.117
(0.334)
0.963
(0.779)
1.467**
(0.011)
0.831*
(0.081)
1.103
(0.342)
0.707***
(0.001)
1.126**
(0.036)
499

Number of
observations
Log likelihood
-2280.070
-2280.067
-2273.045
-2273.008
LR test Statistics
0.007
14.071
14.124
p-value for LR test
0.9333
0.0028
0.0069
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.11

Median duration differences of peer effects for partial breastfeeding
duration models
With Peer Effects only

models

Exponential

Weibull

Loglogistic

Lognormal

Cox Proportional

Intercept

0.6808

0.5743

-0.3006

-0.1970

0.0000

0.2500

0.5000

0.7500

Median
Duration

21.1543

22.9823

19.3026

18.9928

11.6357

14.9406

19.1841

24.6328

P12

7.6333

8.2616

3.9878

4.4405

3.1991

4.1078

5.2745

6.7726

P35

6.2978

6.9735

5.5097

4.3050

2.8068

3.6041

4.6277

5.9421

Pmore

19.6033

22.0565

17.4511

17.1096

8.9085

11.4387

14.6876

18.8593

With WIC and Peer Effects
models

Exponential

Weibull

Loglogistic

Lognormal

Intercept

0.6568

0.5503

-0.2678

-0.1506

0.0000

0.2500

0.5000

0.7500

Median
Duration

21.3156

23.1684

19.0702

18.6904

12.0338

15.4517

19.8404

25.4756

P12

7.6944

8.3348

3.8662

4.3031

3.3112

4.2517

5.4592

7.0098

P35

6.4373

7.1298

5.3431

4.1472

2.9539

3.7929

4.8701

6.2534

Pmore

19.8844

22.3806

17.0130

16.6388

9.2916

11.9307

15.3193

19.6703
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Cox Proportional

Table 2.12

Estimates of the proportional hazard model for exclusive breastfeeding
duration (hazard ratios, p-values in parentheses).

Variable
WIC

Without WIC
or peer effects
(1)

P12

With WIC
effects only
(2)
1.179
(0.193)

P35
pmore
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Smoke
Mother _breastfed
Inc_gt50
Comfort
Income

0.957***
(0.002)
0.568***
(0.000)
0.766*
(0.079)
0.833
(0.365)
1.250
(0.136)
1.104
(0.527)
1.130
(0.521)
0.653***
(0.002)
1.000
(0.999)
0.929
(0.613)
1.174**
(0.040)
285

0.960***
(0.004)
0.588***
(0.000)
0.762*
(0.074)
0.829
(0.355)
1.248
(0.139)
1.107
(0.516)
1.122
(0.551)
0.653***
(0.002)
0.995
(0.972)
0.912
(0.535)
1.158*
(0.061)
285

With peer
effects only
(3)
0.926
(0.717)
0.901
(0.615)
0.690*
(0.060)
0.959***
(0.003)
0.587***
(0.001)
0.784
(0.112)
0.846
(0.410)
1.283*
(0.096)
1.187
(0.284)
1.081
(0.689)
0.702**
(0.011)
1.000
(1.000)
0.976
(0.868)
1.187**
(0.033)
285

With WIC and
peer effects
(4)
1.186
(0.189)
0.877
(0.543)
0.880
(0.540)
0.676**
(0.047)
0.962***
(0.007)
0.607***
(0.001)
0.776*
(0.098)
0.843
(0.400)
1.274
(0.105)
1.183
(0.295)
1.081
(0.690)
0.700**
(0.011)
0.998
(0.986)
0.959
(0.776)
1.168*
(0.053)
285

Number of
observations
Log likelihood
-1303.799
-1302.954
-1301.240
-1300.380
LR test Statistics
1.691
5.118
6.839
p-value for LR test
0.1935
0.1634
0.1446
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.13

Median duration differences of peer effects for exclusive breastfeeding
duration models
With Peer Effects only

models

Exponential

Weibull

oglogistic

lognormal

Cox Proportional

Intercept

0.8313

0.9138

0.3603

0.7363

0.0000

0.3000

0.6000

0.9000

Median
Duration

7.9244

6.8036

6.7937

6.6279

8.9374

12.0643

16.2851

21.9825

P12

0.9578

0.6870

1.9453

1.6583

0.7163

0.9670

1.3052

1.7619

P35

1.3917

0.9639

2.4191

1.8808

0.9855

1.3303

1.7957

2.4239

Pmore

3.3603

2.4494

5.9903

4.6189

4.0132

5.4173

7.3126

9.8710

With WIC and Peer Effects
models

Exponential

Weibull

loglogistic

lognormal

Intercept

0.9332

0.9885

0.6205

0.9396

0.0000

0.3000

0.6000

0.9000

Median
Duration

7.3068

6.3613

5.9300

5.9616

7.1093

9.5966

12.9540

17.4861

P12

1.1427

0.8520

1.8164

1.6673

1.0016

1.3520

1.8250

2.4634

P35

1.3931

0.9809

2.2576

1.7439

0.9684

1.3072

1.7645

2.3818

Pmore

3.1799

2.3588

5.1720

4.1374

3.4089

4.6015

6.2114

8.3845
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Table 2.14

Descriptive Statistics for Peer Effect Models

Variable
Initiation
Bf_m3
Exbf_m3
Bf_m6
Exbf_m6
Duration
Ex_duration
P12
P35
Pmore
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_breastfed
Smoke
Inc_gt50
Income
Comfort

N
1521
1225
1225
1077
1077
1271
1483
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521
1521

Mean
0.9428
0.6751
0.3837
0.5571
0.0381
25.4985
5.7479
0.2025
0.2972
0.3866
28.9224
0.7574
0.8416
0.8462
0.3044
0.2124
0.5299
0.0730
0.4970
2.8641
0.6670
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st. dev.
Min
0.2323 0.0000
0.4685 0.0000
0.4865 0.0000
0.4970 0.0000
0.1915 0.0000
20.7675 0.0000
8.5920 0.0000
0.4020 0.0000
0.4572 0.0000
0.4871 0.0000
5.4557 18.0000
0.4288 0.0000
0.3653 0.0000
0.3609 0.0000
0.4603 0.0000
0.4091 0.0000
0.4993 0.0000
0.2602 0.0000
0.5002 0.0000
2.0046 0.1500
0.4704 0.0000

Max
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
63.5714
49.3600
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
47.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
20.8600
1.0000

Table 2.15

Peer Effects and the Likelihood of Breastfeeding Initiation

Variable

Without Peers

With Peers

0.001
(0.001)
0.020
(0.014)
0.047***
(0.015)
-0.019
(0.017)
0.014
(0.013)
0.026
(0.017)
0.040***
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.019)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.031***
(0.012)
0.036***
(0.012)

-0.009
(0.018)
0.014
(0.018)
0.037*
(0.019)
0.001
(0.001)
0.016
(0.014)
0.046***
(0.014)
-0.022
(0.017)
0.013
(0.013)
0.022
(0.017)
0.033***
(0.012)
-0.014
(0.019)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.030**
(0.012)
0.035***
(0.012)

Number of observations

1521

1521

Log likelihood

-302.105

-297.773

Peer_12
Peer_35
Peer_gt5
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_ breastfed
Smoke
Income
Inc_gt50
Comfort

LR test

8.663

p-value for LR test

0.0341

Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level;
***significant at 1% level.
For the Probit model, marginal effects are reported.
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Table 2.16

Peer Effects and the Likelihood of Breastfeeding
Variable
Peer_12
Peer_35
Peer_gt5
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_
breastfed
Smoke
Income
Inc_gt50
Comfort
Number of
observations

Partial Breastfeeding
Month 3
Month 6
0.022
0.097*
(0.044)
(0.055)
0.038
0.077
(0.041)
(0.052)
0.155***
0.198***
(0.041)
(0.050)
0.011***
0.011***
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.124***
0.168***
(0.031)
(0.037)
0.146*** 0.118***
(0.035)
(0.042)
0.002
0.062
(0.036)
(0.043)
-0.031
-0.028
(0.028)
(0.033)
0.062*
0.033
(0.034)
(0.038)
0.071***
0.096***
(0.026)
(0.029)
-0.180*** -0.145**
(0.049)
(0.064)
-0.006
-0.021***
(0.007)
(0.008)
-0.019
-0.032
(0.025)
(0.029)
0.124***
0.114***
(0.025)
(0.030)
1225
1077

Exclusive Breastfeeding
Month 3
Month 6
0.032
-0.025
(0.052)
(0.294)
0.066
-0.045*
(0.048)
(0.023)
0.161***
0.014
(0.046)
(0.019)
0.005**
-0.001
(0.003)
(0.001)
0.126***
0.039*
(0.036)
(0.021)
0.168***
0.065**
(0.042)
(0.030)
0.143***
0.053*
(0.041)
(0.031)
-0.064**
0.003
(0.041)
(0.013)
0.038
-0.007
(0.034)
(0.015)
0.075***
0.008
(0.027)
(0.012)
-0.241***
0.041*
(0.066)
(0.024)
-0.004
-0.004
(0.007)
(0.003)
-0.067**
0.021*
(0.026)
(0.012)
0.105***
0.016
(0.028)
(0.014)
1225
1077

Log
-671.537
-661.481
-724.857
-152.730
likelihood
Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level;
***significant at 1% level.
For the Probit models, marginal effects are reported.
Different sample sizes are due to different number of observations with missing values
for the dependent variables
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Table 2.17

Peer Effects and the Partial Breastfeeding Duration

Variable

Peer_12
Peer_35
Peer_gt5
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_ breastfed
Smoke
Income
Inc_gt50
Comfort

OLS

2.608
(1.841)
2.131
(1.768)
9.163***
(1.815)
0.700***
(0.107)
5.273***
(1.344)
6.939***
(1.413)
2.169
(1.486)
-1.741
(1.239)
2.005
(1.375)
3.744***
(1.102)
-8.172***
(1.847)
-1.551
(1.081)
-0.522*
(0.286)
5.921***
(1.119)
1271

Truncated
Normal
Hurdle

3.511*
(1.932)
1.922
(1.838)
8.769***
(1.879)
0.720***
(0.110)
5.384***
(1.394)
6.256***
(1.496)
2.681*
(1.519)
-2.118*
(1.274)
1.702
(1.386)
3.016***
(1.125)
8.775***
(1.980)
-0.573
(1.108)
-0.638**
(0.287)
5.188***
(1.158)
1184

Coefficients

Tobit model
Unconditiona
l Marginal
Effects

Conditional
Marginal
Effects

2.790
(2.419)
2.434
(2.321)
11.481***
(2.320)
0.844***
(0.136)
6.449***
(1.723)
9.517***
(1.923)
2.535
(1.938)
-1.977
(1.562)
2.946
(1.808)
4.931***
(1.409)
-9.628***
(2.557)

2.063
(1.785)
1.801
(1.714)
8.424***
(1.674)
0.625***
(0.101)
4.765***
(1.266)
6.992***
(1.386)
1.877
(1.433)
-1.464
(1.157)
2.178
(1.333)
3.647***
(1.040)
-7.052***
(1.827)

0.995
(0.862)
0.868
(0.828)
4.076***
(0.826)
0.301***
(0.050)
2.298***
(0.617)
3.381***
(0.684)
0.905
(0.692)
-0.705
(0.558)
1.050
(0.644)
1.758***
(0.505)
-3.414***
(0.902)

-2.222
(1.381)
-0.787**
(0.361)
7.825***
(1.425)
1271

-1.645
(1.022)
-0.583**
(0.267)
5.777***
(1.045)

-0.793
(0.493)
-0.281**
(0.129)
2.788***
(0.513)

Number of
observations
R-squared
0.207
0.194
0.031
F-statistic
31.18
Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level;
***significant at 1% level.

99

Table 2.18

Peer Effects and the Exclusive Breastfeeding Duration

Variable

Peer_12
Peer_35
Peer_gt5
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_ breastfed
Smoke
Income
Inc_gt50
Comfort
Number of
observations
R-squared
F-statistic

OLS

Truncated
Normal
Hurdle

Coefficients

0.516
(0.619)
0.68
(0.633)
2.93***
(0.663)
0.072*
(0.042)
1.596***
(0.473)
2.093***
(0.482)
2.25***
(0.508)
-0.58
(0.486)
0.717
(0.598)
0.763*
(0.439)
-1.140*
(0.642)
-0.644
(0.434)
-0.075
(0.112)
2.381***
(0.421)
1483

-0.003
(1.166)
1.152
(1.165)
3.086***
(1.149)
0.107
(0.070)
2.788***
(0.832)
2.389***
(0.840)
0.759
(0.967)
-1.450*
(0.764)
0.326
(0.842)
0.994
(0.670)
-2.539**
(1.061)
-0.301
(0.664)
0.105
(0.162)
2.181***
(0.709)
717

1.478
(1.589)
1.692
(1.502)
5.479***
(1.484)
0.104
(0.084)
2.896***
(1.093)
4.717***
(1.253)
6.560***
(1.285)
-0.797
(0.967)
1.478
(1.085)
1.323
(0.869)
-0.505
(1.628)
-1.172
(0.845)
-0.143
(0.220)
5.174***
(0.907)
1483

0.104
14.79

0.120
-

0.024
-
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Tobit model
Unconditiona
l Marginal
Effects

0.733
(0.807)
0.834
(0.755)
2.748***
(0.771)
0.050
(0.041)
1.339***
(0.483)
2.070***
(0.493)
2.755***
(0.771)
-0.381
(0.459)
0.732
(0.551)
0.638
(0.418)
-0.241
(0.767)
-0.566
(0.408)
-0.069
(0.106)
2.376***
(0.394)

Conditional
Marginal
Effects

0.531
(0.581)
0.605
(0.545)
1.989***
(0.554)
0.037
(0.030)
0.990***
(0.362)
1.557***
(0.386)
2.107***
(0.373)
-0.279
(0.337)
0.531
(0.040)
0.466
(0.305)
-0.176
(0.564)
-0.413
(0.298)
-0.050
(0.078)
1.763***
(0.297)

Table 2.19

Estimates for the participation equation of the truncated normal hurdle
models

Variable
Peer_12
Peer_35
Peer_gt5
Age
Married
College
White
South
West
Mother_ breastfed
Smoke
Income
Inc_gt50
Comfort

Breastfeeding
duration
-0.079
(0.178)
0.133
(0.180)
0.356*
(0.191)
0.006
(0.012)
0.137
(0.138)
0.440***
(0.142)
-0.165
(0.173)
0.133
(0.133)
0.209
(0.168)
0.308**
(0.122)
-0.094
(0.191)
-0.299**
(0.120)
0.027
(0.035)
0.326***
(0.116)

Exclusive breastfeeding
duration
0.135
(0.124)
0.102
(0.118)
0.335***
(0.117)
0.003
(0.007)
0.116
(0.087)
0.313***
(0.099)
0.536***
(0.099)
0.004
(0.078)
0.116
(0.090)
0.069
(0.070)
0.134
(0.131)
-0.086
(0.069)
-0.017
(0.018)
0.357***
(0.072)

Number of observations 1271

1483

Pseudo R-squared

0.055

0.103

65.13
112.71
Likelihood ratio 𝜒 2
Standard errors in parentheses; intercept not reported; *significant at 1% level;
**significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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Figure 2.1

Total WIC participation, FY1974-FY2014

Figure 2.2

WIC Program Costs, FY1974-FY2014

Data source: http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program
The costs shown are nominal.
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Figure 2.3

Survival function by prenatal WIC participation status
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Figure 2.4

Schoenfeld residuals for duration models
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APPENDIX A
SCENARIO 1– PRODUCT SPACE COLLUSION WITH EX POST COURNOT
OUTPUT
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Case 1: Let each firm consider producing only product A. When both firms produce only
A qB  0 , the game degenerates to a classic duopoly where the representative firm’s
objective function is Max  A, j  [a  b(qA,i  qA, j )  c]qA,i , i  j . By doing so, the
q A ,i |qA ,2

system of reaction functions of each firm are q A,1 
where the optimal quantity for each firm is q*A,1 
competition, each firm earns  A,1 

only B, qA  0 and q

*
B ,1

a  c q A,2
a  c q A,1
and q A,2 
,


2b
2
2b
2

ac
 q*A,2 . Therefore, under Cournot
3b

( a  c) 2
  A,2 .Similarly, when both firm produce
9b
2

( a  c)
ac
  B ,2 . These payoffs

 qB* ,2 , resulting in  B ,1 
9b
3b

are depicted in the top left and middle center cells of table 1.1.16
Case 2: Let each firm considers producing each product separately, thus the game
degenerates to the cases analyzed in past research that uses a Bowley model. Let firm1
consider producing only A and firm 2 producing only B. In this case, the objective
functions for the two firms are Max  A,1  [a  b(qA,1   qB,2 )  c]qA,1 and
q A ,1 |qB ,2

Max  B,2  [a  b( qA,1  qB,2 )  c]qB,2 resulting in the inter-firm reaction functions,

qB ,2 |q A ,1

q A,1 

a  c  qB ,2
a  c  qA,1
and qB ,2 
. The optimal quantities for firm 1 and 2of


2b
2
2b
2

product A and B is q*A,1 

16

( a  c)
 qB* ,2 . Therefore, under Cournot competition, each firm
b(2   )

The second order derivatives for the profit functions are both -2b, which is negative since b is positive. Therefore,

the second order conditions are satisfied.
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earns  A,1 

(a  c) 2
(a  c) 2




  A,2 . These payoffs are
and
conversely,
B ,2
B ,1
b(2   )2
b(2   )2

depicted in the middle left and middle top cells of table 1.1.17
Case 3: We begin extending the assumption that firms are uniquely identified by
their product. Let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while firm 2 considers
producing only A. The firms objective functions are now

Max

 A&B,1  [a  b(qA,1  qA,2   qB,1 )  c]qA,1  [a  b( (qA,1  qA,2 )  qB,1 )  c]qB,1 and

Max

 A,2  [a  b(qA,1  qA,2   qB,1 )  c]qA,2 , which result in the system of intra- and

q A ,1 , qB ,1 |q A ,2

qA ,2 |qA ,1 , qB ,1

inter-firm reaction functions qA,1 
and qA,2 
q*A,1 

a  c bqA,2  2b qB ,1
a  c 2b qA,1  b q A,2
, qB ,1 


2b
2b
2b
2b

a  c bqA,1  b qB ,1
. The optimal quantities of each product for firm 1 are

2b
2b

( a  c)
ac
(2   )(a  c)
and qB* ,1 
, while for firm 2 q*A,2 
. Therefore, under
2b(1   )
3b
6b(1   )

Cournot competition the total payoff for firm 1 is  A& B ,1 

2is  A,2

17

(13  5 )(a  c)2
and for firm
36b(1   )

(a  c) 2

, the same holding true for various similar relative product positions.
9b

Again, the second order conditions are satisfied since the second order derivatives for the profit functions of both

firms are -2b, which is negative.
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These payoffs are depicted in the bottom left, top right, middle left and right cells of table
1.1.18
Case 4: Let each firm consider producing both products. The representative firm’s
objective function i  1, 2 is therefore

Max

q A , i , q B , i |q A , j , q B , j

 A&B ,i

 [a  b(q A,i  q A, j   (q B,i  q B, j ))  c]q A,i  [a  b( (q A,i  q A, j )  q B,i  q B, j )  c]q B,i ,
i  j , which results in the system of intra- and inter-firm reaction functions

qA,1 

a  c bqA,2  2b qB ,1  b qB ,2
a  c bqB ,2  2b qA,1  b qA,2
, qB ,1 
,


2b
2b
2b
2b

qA,2 

a  c abqA,1  b qB,1  2b qB,2
a  c bqB ,1  b qA,1  2b qA,2


and qB ,2 
. The
2b
2b
2b
2b

optimal quantities for both firms are q*A,i  qB* ,i 

(a  c)
 q*A, j  qB* , j . Therefore, under
3b(1   )

Cournot competition, each firm’s total payoff is  A& B ,i

2(a  c)2

  A& B , j . These payoffs
9b(1   )

are depicted in the bottom right cell of table 1.1.19

  2b

18 The Hessian matrix for the profit function of the firm that produces both products is   2b
negative definite since

| H1 |

= -2b < 0 and

 2b 
 2b  , which is

| H 2 | 4b 2 (1   2 ) >0 given that b > 0 and 0    1 , and the

second order derivative for profit function of the firm that produce a single product is -2b. Therefore, the second order
conditions are satisfied.

| H 2 | =0 when  =1, which is a special case that we discuss later.

  2b
 2b
19
Again, the Hessian matrices for both firms’ profit functions are 
therefore, the second order conditions are satisfied.
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 2b 
 2b  , which is negative definite,

Equilibrium: Based on the matrix of Cournot outcomes across product profiles depicted
in table 1.1, several features of the market segmentation game can now be discussed.
First, when A and B are perfect substitutes (   1 ), all payoffs are equal and the problem
degenerates to the classic Cournot game between two firms producing a homogenous
good. Secondly, denoting by the conditional choice payoffs in table 1.1 as π|{choice firm
1, choice firm 2}, we find from firm 2’s perspective that

 |{A, A}   |{A, B}   |{ A, A & B} ,  |{B, B}   |{B, A}   |{B, A & B} , and

 |{A & B, A}   |{A & B, B}   |{A & B, A & B}  0    1 . Firm 1 has same
incentive to defect to multiproduct production. Therefore producing both products is a
unilateral strictly dominant strategy, resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium {A&B | Cournot, A&B | Cournot}.
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APPENDIX B
SCENARIO 2–OUTPUT COLLUSION UNDER EX ANTE MARKET
SEGMENTATION
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Firms now consider their collusive joint profit maximization objective function

Max  A,1   B,2  (a  b(qA,1   qB,2 )  c)qA,1  (a  b( qA,1  qB,2 )  c)qB,2 . This is the

q A ,1 , qB ,2

discriminating monopolist’s objective function. First order conditions result in the
system of inter-firm reaction functions q A,1 

ac
ac
  q A,1 . The
  qB ,2 and qB ,2 
2b
2b

optimal level of output by Firm 1 and 2 is q*A,1 

ac
 qB* ,2 . By substitution of the
2b(1   )

optimal levels of output into the objective function results in total joint profits of

 A,1   B,2 

(a  c) 2
. Therefore, due to firm and demand symmetry results in equal
2b(1   )

( a  c) 2
  collusion ,2 .
market shares and each firm’s collusive earnings are  collusion,1 
4b(1   )
These payoffs are provided in the upper left cell in table 1.2.
By substitution of either firm’s collusive output quantity into the rival’s reaction function
*
results in the defector’s output of qdefection
,i 

(a  c)(2   )
 i  1, 2 . Substituting the
4b(1   )

defector and colluder’s outputs into each firms objective function results in the defector
and colluder earnings of  defection,i

(a  c)2 (2   )2 (a  c) 2 (2   (  2))


  collusion, j
16b(1   )2
8b(1   )2

i  j and  0 <   1. These relative payoffs are provided in the upper right and lower

left cells in table 1.2. The lower right payoffs are the Cournot outcomes of a segmented
market from table 1.1.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in table 1.2 between the colluder’s payoff when their
rival defects illustrates that  collusion,i   Cournot , j  0    1 . Because  Cournot ,i   collusion,i
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 0    1 when j defects, defection in the static game is symmetrically preferred.
Therefore, producing Cournot output is a unilateral strictly dominant strategy resulting in
the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under ex ante market segmentation of
{Cournot, Cournot}.
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SCENARIO 3– OUTPUT COLLUSION UNDER EX ANTE MULTIPRODUCT
(CONGLOMERATE) PRODUCTION

120

By taking the first order condition of the joint profit maximization objective function
Max

q A ,1 , qB ,1 , q A ,2 , qB ,2

 A& B ,1   A& B ,2 

[a  c  b(q A,1  q A,2   (qB ,1  qB ,2 ))]q A,1  [a  c  b(qB ,1  qB ,2   (q A,1  q A,2 ))]qB ,1 
[a  c  b(q A,1  q A,2   (qB ,1  qB ,2 ))]q A,2  [a  c  b(qB ,1  qB ,2   (q A,1  q A,2 ))]qB ,2

results in the system of inter- and intra-firm reaction functions

qA,1 

ac
ac
 (qA,2   (qB ,1  qB ,2 )) , qB ,1 
 (qB ,2   (qA,1  qA,2 )) ,
2b
2b

qA,2 

ac
ac
 (qA,1   (qB ,1  qB ,2 )) and qB ,2 
 (qB ,1   (qA,1  qA,2 )) . Because of
2b
2b

firm symmetry resulting in equal market shares the optimal collusive quantities for both
firms and each product are q*A,1  qB* ,1 

( a  c)
 q*A,2  qB* ,2 . Substitution of the optimal
4b(1   )

levels of output into the objective function results in total joint profits

 A& B ,1   A& B ,2

(a  c) 2

. Therefore, each firm’s equal market share of the collusive
2b(1   )

earnings are  collusion,1 

( a  c) 2
= collusion ,2 . These payoffs are located in the upper left
4b(1   )

cell of table 1.3.
By substitution of either firm’s collusive output quantity into their rivals Cournot intraand inter-firm reaction functions from the first stage results in the defectors output of
*
qdefection
,i 

3(a  c)
i  j . By substitution of collusion and defection outputs into each
8b(1   )

firms objective function results in the defector/colluder earnings of

 defection,i

9(a  c)2
3(a  c)2


  collusion, j i  j . These relative payoffs are provided in
32b(1   ) 16b(1   )
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the upper right and lower left cells in table 1.3. The lower right payoffs are the Cournot
outcomes of a multiproduct market from table 1.1.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in table 1.3between symmetric collusion and
Cournot we have  collusion,i   Cournot ,i  i  1, 2 . Again, output collusion in both products
Pareto dominates multiproduct (conglomerate)Cournot. Comparison of the colluder’s
payoff when their rival defects illustrates that  collusion,i   Cournot , j  0    1 . Because

 Cournot ,i   collusion,i  0    1 when j defects, defection in the static game is
symmetrically preferred. Therefore, producing Cournot output is a unilateral strictly
dominant strategy resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under ex ante
multiproduct (conglomerate) Nash equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
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SCENARIO 4 – COLLUSION ACROSS BOTH PRODUCT SPACE AND OUTPUT

123

Following scenario 1, case 3, let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while firm 2
considers producing only B. The firms objective functions would be

Max

q A ,1 , qB ,1 |qB,2

 A&B,1  [a  b(qA,1   (qB,1  qB,2 ))  c]qA,1  [a  b( qA,1  qB,1  qB,2 )  c]qB,1 and

Max  B,2  [a  b( qA,1  qB,1  qB,2 )  c]qB,2 , which would result in the system of intra-

qB,2 |qA ,1 , qB ,1

and inter-firm reaction functions qA,1 

qB ,1 

a  c 2b qB,1  b qB ,2
,

2b
2b

a  c 2b qA,1  bqB,2
a  c b qA,1  bqB ,1


and qB,2 
. However, under complete
2b
2b
2b
2b

*

collusion firm 2 continues producing monopoly output of product B, qB,2

ac
,
4b(1   )

under the belief that firm 1 is producing only product A at the joint profit maximizing
output (Appendix B, scenario 2). If firm 1 defects and produces product B while firm 2
continues to produce the monopoly output of B, firm 1’soptimal quantities of each
product are q*A,1 

( a  c)
( a  c)
and qB* ,1 
.Substituting the defector and colluder’s
4b(1   )
2b(1   )

outputs into each firm’s objective function results in defector and colluder earnings of

 defection,1 

(a  c)2 (5  4 ) (a  c) 2 (1  2 )

  collusion,2  0   <1 . The same relative
16b(1   )2
8b(1   )2

payoffs hold true from defection by firm 2 if firm 1 maintains collusion. These payoffs
are depicted in the top right and bottom left cells of table 1.4.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in table 1.4the colluder’s payoff when their rival
defects illustrates that  collusion,i   defection, j  0    1 . Because  Cournot ,i   collusion,i

 0    1 when j defects, defection in the static game is symmetrically preferred.
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Therefore, producing Cournot output and entering the rivals market is a unilateral strictly
dominant strategy resulting in the unique Nash equilibrium of {A&B, Cournot; A&B,
Cournot}.
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